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6  
Introduction 
 
 
 
IN ONE of the main sequences of The Crowd (King Vidor, 1928), when the 
daughter of the protagonist dies, another character tells him abruptly: “The 
world doesn’t stop just because you are in pain.” Besides working as the 
perfect translation of the consciousness of mortality as the most avoided 
subject in our contemporary world, the film sequence entails the self-
reflexive and ironic contradiction of a cosmos – the cosmos of the film viewer 
– that stops its march to see the human vulnerability towards death in front 
of its eyes.  
Even though The Crowd is a work of fiction, a construction underpinned by 
the line of thought of Vidor and obeying a predetermined arrangement and 
narrative, what is here at stake is the same profound critique to a 
phenomenon that is, to our mind, mainly brought to the fore through the 
indexically real framings of documentary films. In 1928 as in 2015, Western 
societies seem to repudiate mortality. Following that line of thought, I argue 
that the intersection between the phenomenology of death and image and the 
phenomenology of time consciousness demands new viewpoints and 
updates.  
It is imperative to underline, nonetheless, that the classical juncture of death, 
image and time had prevailed throughout history as one of the most 
recurrent motifs. In What is Cinema?, André Bazin described an intersection 
linked to the act of embalming time, where cinema could exist as objectivity 
and perseverance. Affirming that all arts are based on the presence of the 
man, he suggested photography as the only exhibition window taking 
advantage of one’s absence.1 In Death Every Afternoon, to which I will return 
later on, Bazin presented the suggestive claim that “before cinema there was 
only the profanation of corpses and the desecration of tombs.”2 For Mary 
Ann Doane, focused on the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the 
tendency to depict death in a direct and unmediated way for the gaze of the 
spectator constituted a brief moment in film history.3 In The Emergence of 
Cinematic Time: Modernity, Contingency, the Archive, a vital reference 
concerning image and temporality, Doane explored the disturbing moving-
images of executions as registered in the short-lived genre of the actuality, 
stating that “death would seem to mark the insistence and intractability of 
the real in representation.”4  
The hypothesis of the present thesis is that a methodological approach using 
film phenomenology in relation to the representation of dying in 
documentary cinema can be an effective way to decode symptoms of 
consciousness towards the inexorable death, as well as exploring our                                                         
1  André Bazin, What is Cinema?, ed. and trans., Hugh Gray (Berkeley and LA: 
California University Press, 1967), 9-16. 
2  André Bazin, “Death Every Afternoon”, Rites of Realism: Essays on Corporeal 
Cinema, ed. Ivone Margulies, trans., Mark A. Cohen (Duke University Press, 2003), 
31. 
3 Mary Ann Doane, The Emergence of Cinematic Time: Modernity, Contingency, The 
Archive (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: Harvard University Press, 
2002), 164. 
4 Ibid., 145. 
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perceptive and existential modalities while having as a starting point 
aesthetic experiences. I argue, however, that a phenomenological approach 
to the filmic experience should be materialized beyond solipsistic 
descriptions of the sensory or the haptic, without renouncing to their value 
and evocative manifestation. As Malin Wahlberg, I also acknowledge 
semiotic phenomenology “as a continuous, mind-opening, and nontotalizing 
discourse where the problems and shortfalls of both classical philosophy and 
contemporary theory meet with the insights into existential, psychological, 
and aesthetic issues that were consciously bracketed and excluded after the 
structuralist turn.”5 Following that line of thought, I have conceived a thesis 
between film phenomenology, film analysis and film theory, where the I/eye 
of my intimate experience and corresponding views, descriptions and 
interpretations intersect concrete theoretical framework and sociocultural 
existential matters. Through the aesthetic representation of dying in Near 
Death (Frederick Wiseman, 1989) – equivalent to the disquieting rise of a 
roller coaster before the expected fall, since in both fear coexists with a 
vulnerable promise of protection – I will attempt to find the junctures where 
I can, to some extent, encounter the other and myself within the lived-world, 
a shared place haunted by the enigma of our limited time.  
In the first chapter, Death, Dying and Film Phenomenology, I expose the 
denial and deconstruction of death within the contemporary world, 
supported by the ideas of Philippe Ariès and Zygmunt Bauman and 
considering the emotional responses of the Western culture. By presenting 
some examples of death as an indexically real screen event, I underline the 
opposition between the effects of its abstract and concentrated depiction in 
fiction and its provocative and ethically charged representation in 
documentary. Due to widespread real-images of death beyond the cinematic, 
I will also attempt to describe how these moving-images of new media 
influence our readings of documentary cinema.  
Even more than a necrophobic attitude or a limited understanding of a final 
void, I argue that it is the representation of dying as a documentary event 
what activates self-awareness towards death. In order to present the core 
tools of my methodology and theoretical framework, I introduce my readings 
on Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s existential phenomenology and on Vivian 
Sobchack’s semiotic phenomenology, which luminously applied Ponty’s 
Phenomenology of Perception to the filmic experience.  
In the second chapter, On Near Death (Frederick Wiseman, 1989), I analyse 
one of the mementos in which, to my mind, death’s vibrant density is justly 
represented – because aware of its own mysteries – and able to confront our 
blurred perception. Studying a documentary film as Near Death, which 
moved me and disquieted me sorely, can, ultimately, produce new questions 
around the complexities in the representation of mortality and underscore 
unsolved outcomes regarding the film viewer. My main research question is 
here highlighted: Is the filmic representation of dying as an indexically real 
event capable of motivating self-awareness towards death? If yes, how can 
film phenomenology help to describe, thematize and interpret that 
consciousness? Departing from the idea of the dying body as a body in 
between, I explore the cinematic concepts of the face, voice and temporality. 
Among other authors, I will work under the ideas and impressions of Maurice 
                                                        
5  Malin Wahlberg, Documentary Time: Film and Phenomenology (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2008), Introduction, xii. 
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Merleau-Ponty, Vivian Sobchack, Mary Ann Doane, Margaret Gibson, Gilles 
Deleuze, Don Ihde and André Bazin.  
Why to establish a dialogue with Near Death? Why this particular film? If a 
film such as Near Death remains so meaningful and provocative today, it is 
primarily due to what Amos Vogel reminded us: “There are so few film 
records of individuals dying of natural causes; it is rather war deaths or 
executions that have been caught on film.”6 Even though the human figures 
of Wiseman’s documentary are less abruptly violated by death than going 
downstream in the course of life, watching them close, withdrawing them 
from anonymity, produces equally disquieting feelings. Challenged by their 
own existential thoughts, the human representations within the film attempt 
to define and comprehend death themselves, existing beyond the objectifying 
sphere of the dying body. By allowing us to know the person within the body, 
Wiseman enhances our emotional responses. Our encounter with a dying 
subject is undeniably different from death as a general and abstract 
cinematic motif, generating new interactions and interrogations.  
On a filmic scope where real death is, as depicted by the numerous paradigms 
I will further mention, linked to an abrupt and swift happening, how can we 
deal with a documentary showing an extended survey of the dying process? 
When registering the act of dying, the filmed subject shares, concomitantly 
with the other and with himself or herself, a personal and idiosyncratic 
experience, through an approach never comparable to the filmic 
representation of the body-object. In other words, the existential 
phenomenology revealed by an attentive look at dying is, I argue, the closest 
I can be to my own existential interrogations concerning the event of death. 
The body in between still belongs, to a large extent, to the dimension of the 
lived-world, opposed to the realm of the unknown of death’s aftermath. 
Through semiotic phenomenology, and always underpinned by mediated 
sound and images, I will attempt to describe my relation with the film’s dying 
subjects while reflecting on the space-time experience they inhabit.  
In the third chapter, Remind Me (of Our Limited Time), I conceptualize and 
suggest a philosophical supposition – remind me – as a contract between the 
film viewer and the representation of dying as a documentary event. 
Returning to the pitfall of the subjective experience in film phenomenology, 
I will use the Winter Garden Photograph of Roland Barthes’ Camera Lucida 
in order to reinforce my arguments as a supporter of a phenomenological and 
intimate approach regarding the subject of death and image. What is at stake 
is, ultimately, the recognition of the dying process on the screen as a 
technology of the memory and of the self.  
Epicurus affirmed that “death is nothing to us, since when we are, death has 
not come, and when death has come, we are not” (Principal Doctrines, II). 
While discussing the nothingness of death, I aim to contribute to film 
phenomenology with new outcomes, both relevant for scholars and 
filmmakers, establishing bridges between how (to represent) and why 
(representing). I determinedly believe that the relevance, urgency and 
complexity of the present questions are bigger than the conceivable 
drawbacks. To produce a territory where the confrontation with our past, 
present and future ghosts is possible can, after all, generate new ways of 
thinking.  
                                                        
6 Amos Vogel, Film as a Subversive Art (New York: Random House, 1974), 266. 
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Chapter 1  
Death, Dying and Film 
Phenomenology 
 
1.1. A CONTEMPORARY DENIAL   
 
“Everything is ridiculous if one thinks of death.” 
Thomas Bernhard 
 
 
WHEN PHILIPPE ARIÈS affirms that “death loves to be represented”7, one of 
the main contradictions of the contemporary occidental world seems to come 
to light. If it is accurate to state that death had always find its own vehicles in 
order to be embodied in the physical world of the living, it is also true that 
there seems to be a new averseness in giving death any visibility, expressing 
“the growing belief that death is nothing and that nothingness cannot be 
represented or imagined.”8 
In Western Attitudes Toward Death: From the Middle Ages to the Present, 
Ariès proposes three stages concerning the way we have addressed, 
throughout history, the core question of our limited time. The first period 
could be described by the maxim Et moriemur (“and we shall all die”), 
expressing a time when death was omnipresent, familiar, comprehended as 
an irrevocable law of the species from which mankind did not attempt to 
escape or sensed as terrifying. The second period, beginning on the twelfth 
century, grabbed the idea of collective destiny and replaced it by the concern 
for the individuality of each person, due to phenomena focused on La mort 
de soi (“one’s own death”), such as the thought of Last Judgement at the 
moment of death. Between the sixteenth and the eighteenth centuries, 
several motifs in art and literature linking Thanatos and Eros forced man to 
perceive death as an irrational rupture with the quotidian and the society, 
which was naturally followed by a dramatized, restless and amplified 
conception of mortality and mourning, concomitantly connected to a 
increasing significance of La mort de toi (“the death of the other person”). 
The third stage, corresponding to the present time, is defined as “a brutal 
revolution in traditional ideas and feelings” 9  where death disappears, 
condemned to private spheres and seen as shameful and morbid:  
One must avoid – no longer for the sake of the dying person, but for society’s 
sake, for the sake of those close to the dying person – the disturbance and the 
overly strong and unbearable emotion caused by the ugliness of dying and by 
                                                        
7 Philippe Ariès, Images of Man and Death, trans., Janet Lloyd (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1985), 1. 
8 Ibid., 266. 
9  Philipe Ariés, Western Attitudes Toward Death: From the Middle Ages to the 
Present, trans., Patricia M. Ranum (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1974), 85. 
10  
the very presence of death in the midst of a happy life, for it is henceforth 
given that life is always happy or should always seem to be so.10 
An understanding of this shift is feasible by using the excavating processes of 
media archaeology in order to decode inner contradictions and tensions in 
post-mortem photography. In fact, the act of duplicating death allows us, 
more than outstrip human mortality, to produce knowledge about life itself 
and what characterized it in a specific time. In other words, post-mortem 
photography entails a shared acquaintance approaching both the narratives 
of the dead and the narratives of the living.  
The practice of photographing the dead kept pace with the invention of 
photography in the middle of the nineteenth century, following the 
conception of daguerreotypes and ambrotypes. Some of the most 
mesmerizing post-mortem photographs were, incontrovertibly, taken during 
the Victorian Era. Even though it was considered a period of environmental 
and health enhancements, a cholera epidemic took place in London 
throughout the years of 1848 and 1849, killing thousands of people within a 
society were hospitalization practices were not common. People died and had 
their wakes at home, surrounded by families and friends. What is curious 
after an intimate observation of post-mortem portraits is how the bereaved 
had dissimilar modes of framing the dead bodies. On the one hand, many 
photographs seem to avoid the idea of death, representing the deceased as if 
they were peacefully sleeping or in everyday positions, sustained by wooden 
braces and with the eyes wide open. On the other hand, other photographs 
appear to accentuate a death’s pose, an idea of eternal sleep and everlasting 
stillness, surrounding the bodies with elements such as crown of flowers to 
commemorate the last rite of passage.  
Independently of its angles and variations, it is undeniable that post-mortem 
photographs are, without exemptions, filled with certain forms of tension 
and countless frictions, enclosing an emotional burden for the one who sees 
them in the light of modern times. Perhaps the apparatus itself encircles the 
roots of this response, especially having in mind Susan Sontag’s words when 
proclaiming that “all photographs are memento mori. To take a photograph 
is to participate in another person’s (or thing’s) mortality, vulnerability, 
mutability… all photographs testify to time’s relentless melt.”11 A twofold act 
of remembering and accepting, photographing the corpses commenced to be 
an extinct practice. Ingrid Fernandez writes that “several factors in the 
twentieth century have shaped the relationship of the living and the dead, 
most prominently war, advances in technology promising the optimisation 
and prolongation of life, and the monopolisation of death by both the medical 
and funeral industries.” 12  In both twentieth and twenty-first centuries, 
collective death phenomena and corresponding imagery – vivid through 
numerous pictorial registers and new-fangled in its formats and extent – 
produced different and unsettling effects. Images regarding two world wars, 
the Holocaust, the AIDS epidemic, natural catastrophes and global terrorism 
generated, before and now, reactions of shock and trepidation.  
In our recent history, the events occurred during the 11th of September of 
2001 still work as a prototype of what striking and grotesque images can 
entail. People jumping in despair from the windows of the World Trade                                                         
10 Ibid., 87. 
11 Susan Sontag, On Photography (New York: Farrar, Straux and Giroux, 1977), 15. 
12 Ingrid Fernandez, “The lives of the corpses: Narratives of the image in American 
memorial photography”, Mortality, vol. 16, No. 4 (November 2011), 353. 
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Center’s towers reminded us all of our own fragility, separating us from the 
comfort zones or the precise coordinates of the quotidian. These tiny figures 
forced a confrontation with our own tininess, with our own transition, 
highlighting in their violent strength that the world is larger than us in scale, 
duration and impetuosity. Reproduced countless times, both in the 
aftermath of the 9/11 and in contemporary revisitations, these bodies still 
echo in our society through conscious and unconscious reverberations, as if 
we are continuously falling by their side and shadowing them in their 
enduring in between.  
Can images linked to death restructure established images and signs? Film 
analysis, for example, always taught us to see a low-angled shot – this is, a 
shot taken with the camera in a position below and upward at the subject – 
as the aggrandizement of the subject in focus. Filming a tower or a 
skyscraper, once associated with magnitude, can now connect us to reverse 
ideas: power becomes vulnerability, ascending becomes tumbling. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 – The Falling Man (Richard Dryer, 2001) 
 
The example of the falling bodies of the 9/11 is not unintentional. In fact, 
what the present thesis proposes has less to do with dead bodies than with 
dying bodies, the ones in between. I argue that our contemporary denial of 
death is not as much related to necrophobic repulsions as it is with the void 
of the passage from being to nonbeing. It is the moment where the shift from 
life to death happens, the anticipation of invisibility and the uncertainties 
surrounding the last gasp what truly alarms us.  
Furthermore, it is compulsory to underline that deaths are not comparable: 
a collective death caused by a tsunami is not comparable to one caused by a 
terrorist attack; a suicide is not comparable to a murder; the death of a 
person at the age of ninety years old is not comparable to the death of a child; 
etc. The infinity of contexts, from ethical and religious perspectives to socially 
accepted values, makes unreasonable the task of dealing with the multiplicity 
of deaths by using a single and generalized approach. The impracticability of 
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the act of gathering all the world’s deaths in terms of the effects produced 
within individual or collective consciousnesses is deeply connected to the 
unfeasibility of measuring any sort of magnitude. Nonetheless, in what 
unfolds to be a contradiction, a death is a death, always the same death, 
continuously inexorable independently from any laws of causality.  
Zygmunt Bauman’s idea that modern societies are deconstructing death can, 
however, link Western perceptions of human mortality. Influenced by 
phenomenology and psychoanalysis in Mortality, Immortality & Other Life 
Strategies, Bauman stresses the impossibility to define death, considering it 
“the absolute other of the being, an unimaginable other, hovering beyond 
the reach of communication.”13 According to the author, death is a final void, 
a non-existence, “an absolute nothing” that cannot be experienced. Bearing 
in mind that we all retain the knowledge of our mortality, this acquaintance 
cannot be forgotten but “only be not remembered for a while, with attention 
shifting to other impressions.”14 This mental state of denial points our lives 
toward permanent productivity and creation, toward the constant need for 
action and, ultimately, the search for immortality; a key concept to Bauman, 
who affirms that “immortality is not a mere absence of death; it is defiance 
and denial of death” and, following that line of thought, grasps that “such a 
life – life forgetful of death, life lived as meaningful and worth living, life alive 
with purposes instead of being crushed and incapacitated by purposelessness 
– is a formidable human achievement.”15  
The deconstructed death defended by Bauman consists in the argument that 
in modern societies nobody dies of mortality, but of particular causes of 
death (a haemorrhage, a heart arrest, a lung collapse, etc.). Since death defies 
reason – it cannot be thought by it – it is necessary to supress it, as we 
relentlessly attempt to do with our most offensive and belligerent thoughts:  
The truth that death cannot be escaped ‘in the end’ is not denied, of course. It 
cannot be denied; but it could be held off the agenda, elbowed out by another 
truth: that each particular case of death (most importantly, death which 
threatens the particular person – me; at a particular time – now) can be 
resisted, postponed, or avoided altogether.16  
 
So we forget. Not merely individually but predominantly collectively, 
amongst the crowd that King Vidor simultaneously fictionally represented 
and negatively preconized. Because “there is no more secure place to hide 
than the crowd. The bigger and denser, the better.”17 
 
1. 2 – THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF DEATH AS A SCREEN EVENT 
 
“AND YET (…) the nothingness of death occupies an important place in one of 
the arts of our own time, which is an art of the image, of the living image – 
namely, the cinema.” 18  Although we ought to take into account other                                                         
13 Zygmunt Bauman, Mortality, Immortality & Other Life Strategies (Cambridge, UK: 
Polity Press, 1992), 2. 
14 Ibid., 2-3. 
15 Ibid., 7. 
16 Ibid., 137-138. 
17 Ibid., 172. 
18 Ariès, Images of Man and Death, 266. 
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exhibition windows regarding contemporary depictions of mortality, I argue 
that cinema still works, within its own space-time spheres, as one of the most 
suggestive platforms dealing with the multifaceted relation between death 
and its mysterious signs.  
Rethinking death as a screen event as a whole extent, this is, without being 
underpinned by the complex concept of the cinematic, makes more 
perceptible a contradictory landscape. On the one hand, between fictive 
representations, Internet’s visual policies and the conventions of television 
reports, we unswervingly observe non-graphic, edited, camouflaged, inferred 
and out-of-screen representations of mortality, in which any possible 
shocking effects are under control. These depictions, which we absorb 
massively in our daily life, seem to collectively integrate the current state of 
the world in a socially accepted way, reminding us that death is out there – 
it lives – and yet it still occurs far away, disquieting only a reality of 
anonymity that does not intrude on my life or my inner domains. On the 
other hand, there is a second group regarding death as a screen event that 
seems to produce an interruption, splitting us from the linearity of the 
quotidian and forcing us to experience effects understood as exceedingly 
provocative, aggressive or unbearable. Inside this set of representations we 
can pinpoint fictive genres, such as gore cinema, or other graphic registers, 
from the commonly called sensationalist television reports to documentary 
films exposing mortality in what are socially considered to be abrupt, violent, 
direct, overwhelming and emotional forms. This second category is 
nevertheless very intricate to circumscribe, since the limits of the agonising 
sensations it unfolds cover a sensible spectrum that goes from the bloody 
excess of fictive violence to the unintentional act of registering mortality. In 
addition, there is still a very critical line, between ethics and referents, 
dividing the fictive and the real. A real death is always a death with no filter, 
closer to social mirrors, closer to us. The indexically real – “this is real” – as 
well as the referentially real – “this story is based in real events” – always 
produces an unusual control panel within our inner perception, a permanent 
alert, a sharper knife. A real death opens a precedent: it happened before, it 
could happen again, it could happen to me.   
I argue that two extremely different processes underpin the apparent 
contradiction between overrepresentation and underrepresentation of death 
as a screen event. The first case, dealing with the immense volume of socially 
accepted representations, works as a collaborator of the contemporary 
denial. Functioning by addition and by planting seeds, it tries to erase any 
possible meanings regarding mortality itself, whether linked to social, 
cultural, historical, personal or collective values. As Zygmunt Bauman 
reminds us, “(…) if taken daily, (…) the awesome poison seems to lose its 
venom. Instead, it prompts immunity and indifference to the toxin in the 
inoculated organism.”19 The second case, rare but not inexistent, is a case of 
resistance, always active and never submissive, operating through mementos 
designed to motivate and trigger self-awareness towards the core question of 
our limited time.  
In spite of its universal breadth, there are motives to believe that death as a 
screen event requires qualitative analysis. The cinematic framework is not an 
exception: divergent contexts, from religious influences to social-historical 
backgrounds, are one of the main reasons why creating dialogues and 
establishing comparisons between films regularly sounds as an incomplete 
and extremely daunting task. If we rethink a documentary film such as Of the                                                         
19 Bauman, Mortality, Immortality & Other Life Strategies, 188. 
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Dead (Des Morts, Jean-Pol Ferbus, Dominique Garny, and Thierry Zéno, 
1979), underpinned by an unusual fusion of direct cinema, experimentation 
and film-essay, what is at stake? The disparities within the world are here 
revealed through profound dichotomies between countries such as the 
United States or Belgium and some rural communities in Thailand or South 
Korea. The first group seems to entail a realm where death is directed to the 
anonymity of the hospital and funeral houses, bodies frozen under 
undetermined promises of eternity and grieving expressions repressed in 
cold urban landscapes. The second one appears to point towards a cosmos 
linked to a primitive relationship with the nature, in which the rituals of 
mourning embrace the apparent excess of manifestation, from the sacrifice 
of animals to the shouting laments and human uproar. All of these sturdy 
variations between individuality and community, silence and noise, lack of 
contact and touch, visible and invisible, contribute to the general 
understanding that certain cultural engagements define our relationship 
with death and its images. From a Western point of view, Of the Dead 
reinforces the idea of death as a visual taboo, since its approach largely relies 
on exposing unseen scenes, functioning therefore as morbid, disquieting and, 
in contradiction with its indexicality pointing towards the real, 
phantasmagorical. Somehow, it maintains today what Amos Vogel observed 
in 1979, the same year of the film’s release:  
Now that sex is available to us in hard-core porno films, death remains the one 
last taboo in cinema. However ubiquitous death is – we all ultimately suffer 
from it – it calls into question the social order and its value systems; it attacks 
our mad scramble for power, our simplistic rationalism and our 
unacknowledged, child-like belief in immortality.20 
 
“Why have you died?”, shout the weeping faces in a woman’s funeral in South 
Korea. The abrupt and unsettling sound of the question becomes, together 
with the collective cries of the figures reunited disorderly around her body, 
disquieting for the film viewer. A sound that contrasts – in its form but not 
in its stirring effects – with the monotonous and clinical voice that describes 
the embalming process of a dead man’s body in San Francisco, USA, 
explaining in detail the perseverance processes of the rigor mortis while 
discoursing about tubes, arteries and disinfections. This tension between 
coldness and exuberance, dehumanization and hysteria, accentuated by the 
parallel editing and dialogue between milieus, provokes contradictions 
beyond the rational. Both images and sounds appear to converge towards 
ritualized practices, at the same time they seem curiously unwonted. 
Ultimately, all the framings throughout Of the Dead are presented as having 
no precedent, concomitantly attractive and appalling, as if the filmmakers 
were exploring uncharted or forbidden territories, observing themselves 
these images for the first time.  
 
A step forward in the register of the dead body is The Act of Seeing With One’s 
Own Eyes (Stan Brakhage, 1971), an experimental short filmed on 16mm 
inside a Pittsburgh’s morgue. Exposing several autopsies and surgical 
procedures, from embalming techniques to the removal of organs, the film is 
composed by exceedingly graphic images, always partial, functioning as a 
zoom-in into bodies deprived of any other qualities than their own carnal 
values. Skin, bones, organs, fluids and blood fill the frantic framings, 
contradictorily generating a sense of emptiness, as if life was never nearby. 
The creation of the human hollowness is aided by the lack of sound, being                                                         
20 Amos Vogel, “Grim Death”, Film Comment 16, No. 2 (March-April, 1980), 78. 
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the non-narrative of the film presented as an unbearable circle of human 
leftovers. Brian L. Frye wrote: “The key image of The Act of Seeing With One’s 
Own Eyes is quite likely the bluntest statement on the human condition ever 
filmed. In the course of an autopsy, the skin around the scalp is slit with a 
scalpel, and in preparation for exposing and examining the brain, the face of 
each cadaver is literally peeled off, like a mask, revealing the raw meat 
beneath. That image, once seen, will never leave you.”21 
 
Correspondingly thought-provoking regarding the act of filmmaking and the 
act of film viewing, The Act of Killing (Joshua Oppenheimer, 2012) raised 
many criticisms and condemnations considering the delicate area between 
documentary film and ethics. Following the most powerful death squad in 
North Sumatra, responsible for the 1965-66 anti-communist massacres, 
Oppenheimer’s film plays with continuous re-enactments of the atrocities, 
operating with real murderers and real memories. In one of the most 
asphyxiating sequences of the film, debatably cathartic, the squad leader 
Anwar Congo exhibits to the camera a roof surrounded by high walls as the 
place where he used to do the killings. What follows is a convulsive body 
trying to vomit, gagging in vain, producing the sound of nausea and 
viscerality without being able to expel any matter. Even if Congo claims to 
grasp the thousands of deaths he was responsible for as an accomplishment 
to be glorified, this unexpected and involuntary self-exorcism works, 
ultimately, as the perfect metaphor for the unbearable experience of death as 
atrocity and, most of all, as a disquieting image that we cannot face. The 
context is the opposite of the one of natural death, but it is vital to confront 
the violent images of the extremes in order to expose the vast array of 
connections we are exposed to when it comes to defining a phenomenology 
of death and image in contemporary societies.  
 
Following that line of thought, Grizzly Man (Werner Herzog, 2005) explores 
the outlandish decision of one man, Timothy Treadwell, to live for thirteen 
summers among the wild grizzly bears of an Alaskan reserve. Timothy, who 
believed he could peacefully live among the bears, ended up attacked and 
killed by one of them in 2003. Herzog’s documentary is built upon real 
footage filmed by Treadwell, intercalated with interviews with his friends, 
family and nature connoisseurs. The disconcerting effect of the documentary 
does not have its origin in the brutal death of its protagonist, but in the way 
death is consistently foreseen, with the idea of a lethal nature grasped by him 
as a real and undeviating possibility. By posing himself the question of “what 
is it worth dying for?”, Tim Treadwell finds his own controversial answer, 
converting Grizzly Man into a compelling juncture where death encounters 
human signification.  
 
Likewise on the other side of death as a natural occurrence, it is commanding 
to evoke The Bridge (Eric Steel, 2006). The film director, together with a 
camera crew that filmed night and day using several close-up lenses and 
wide-angles shots, spent a year filming people attempting to throw 
themselves from San Francisco’s Golden Gate Bridge, one of the most 
popular suicide sites in the world. Even though “articles have described the 
film as ‘irresponsible,’ ‘exploitive,’ ‘voyeuristic,’ ‘ghastly’ and ‘immoral’,”22                                                         
21 Brian L. Frye, “Great Directors”, Senses of Cinema, Issue 23 (December, 2002): 
 http://sensesofcinema.com/2002/great-directors/brakhage/ 
(accessed May 25, 2015). 
22 ABC News, “The Bridge of Death” (October 20, 2006): 
http://abcnews.go.com/2020/story?id=2592841&page=1&CMP=OTC-
RSSFeeds0312  
16  
Steel affirmed that the crew was always ready to inform the responsible 
authorities every time they thought someone was about to attempt suicide, 
instead of simply waiting for death to happen. “All of us came to the same 
conclusion that we were human beings first and filmmakers second,”23 Steel 
declared, defending his process of filming from the accusations concerning 
non-ethical behaviors. The fact that they did not manage to save more people 
is linked to one of the conclusions of the documentary: the unexpectancy of 
the jump, the apparent and external non-difference between the touristic 
contemplation and the contemplation of death. The inability of the camera 
to film those peoples’ intentions is set against the testimonial voices of the 
relatives and friends of the suicide victims. When the stories of the dead, as 
told by their poignant speeches, are presented to us, the falling bodies on the 
screen detach themselves from anonymity and become humanized, existing 
way beyond the astonishment and filled with complex inner narratives that 
create a warmer relationship with the film viewer.  
 
“I can tell you, the first time I saw someone die was incredibly painful. And 
even now when I watch it in the theaters, or if I watch it on a small screen, it 
still affects me deeply.”24  
 
The director’s testimony regarding the impact of the falling body hitting the 
water brings three questions of the present thesis to the fore. How to define 
the effect of shock produced within the film viewer after contemplating – or 
anticipating – the transformation from being to nonbeing on the screen? 
Furthermore, how to interpret the suggestion that this effect of awe seems to 
neglect dichotomies between exhibition windows – for example, big screen 
versus small screen – when it comes to the visceral impact of death and 
dying? Last but not least, what are the implications of a screen event that can 
be reproduced infinitely in front of our eyes? It is vital to understand if being 
a witness of the irrevocable instant in time when someone ceases to exist 
creates self-awareness towards one’s death, if it truly affects our perceptual 
modalities and establishes new emotional cartographies within our 
individual and collective imageries.  
 
In that sense, it is imperative to take into account the way moving images 
displaying human mortality also deal with collective traumas. Whether in its 
audiovisual approach or in subsequent reception, these depictions 
commonly offer insights into states of repression and denial. What is at stake 
are healing processes, also brought to the surface by a collective imaginary of 
death.  
 
The most notable examples of such cinematic representations are related to 
the Holocaust, being Shoah (Claude Lanzmann, 1985) and Night and Fog 
(Nuit et Bruillard, Alain Resnais, 1955) at the filmic mountaintop. Lanzmann 
declined any archival record for Shoah, claiming that there was not a single 
image to represent the event.25 Using cinematographic strategies, Lanzmann 
guides the film viewer throughout a contemporary and potential revisitation 
of the horrifying happenings. Capturing echoes still reverberating in 
landscapes once submerged in death, he founds their way to the present 
through the human faces, voices and gestures of those who survived and 
experienced the historical brutality. During 556 minutes of testimonial faces, 
Lanzmann manages to generate a sense of immersion and a vast collection of                                                         
(accessed May 25, 2015). 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Wahlberg, Documentary Time: Film and Phenomenology, 55. 
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voices that gives the film viewer an impression of horizontal and vertical 
entireness.  
 
Working on the other side of the truth, Night and Fog opens with travellings 
along a deserted concentration camp. Covered in green grass, the signs of any 
past inner movement appear to be hidden. These signs, nevertheless, are 
what the director is looking for, between archival footage and old 
photographs, in order to contextualize the Nazi machine and recreate the 
march towards death: trains, train rails, wires, dorms, gas chambers, 
crematoriums. The bodies, at first depicted naked, tattooed, numbered and 
working under hideous conditions, will culminate in piles of burned figures, 
traces of hair, skin and bones. It is by exposing a shared, unanimous state of 
denial that Resnais ends his documentary: “We turn a blind eye to what 
surround us and a deaf ear to humanity’s never-ending cry.” Nevertheless, 
what is at stake in both films is, more than a phenomenology of image and 
death, cinematic schemes regarding trauma, the atrocity, and the fallacious 
representation of memory. Through different approaches regarding visible 
signs and evidences of the gruesome, both Lanzmann and Resnais attempted 
to unveil the traces and vestiges of the lived horror. 
Almost at the end of How to Survive a Plague (David France, 2012), one of 
the members of ACT UP says: “The last one to die, please turn off the lights.” 
Lights being turned on, lights being turned off. Cinematic light has always set 
up ambiances, creating particular worlds in a game of light versus shadow, 
remembering versus forgetting, visible versus invisible. The recent wave of 
documentaries regarding the AIDS epidemic is, undoubtedly, keeping the 
lights on, forcing us to see and remember. Films such as How to Survive a 
Plague, United in Anger: A History of ACT UP (Jim Hubbard, 2013) or We 
Were Here (David Weissman, 2011), by using testimonies in direct address 
with tangible hesitations, anxious breathings, silent pauses and self-reflexive 
interrogations, reveal mourning processes still far from any closure. 
Moreover, it is curious to observe how these films are not afraid of showing 
bodies confronted with their own mortality: wounds, injured skin, loss of 
weight. Having in mind media strategies, individual and collective bodies are 
used as a main form of activism: human streams in protest, ashes thrown in 
the wind, kisses, screams. In sum, suffering bodies used as the ultimate 
weapon, a logical process when there is nothing else to lose.  
What does it mean to frame a human body closer to its own death, confronted 
and disarmed by it? In What Now? Remind Me (E Agora? Lembra-me, 
Joaquim Pinto, 2013), during one of the several flights between Lisbon and 
Madrid in order to take part on an experimenting HCV treatment with new 
and unapproved medications, Pinto, living with HIV and HCV for twenty 
years, films the airplane window. What is at stake here, apart from the search 
for transcendence within quotidian images, is an issue of framing. The 
window – an open or closed window to the world, depending on the film 
viewer’s reading – reveals a self-reflexing game of what framing entails: a 
selection that is linked to partiality, perspective, angle and out-of-frame. In 
other words, it indicates a position to the viewer, both location and 
relocation, both subject and object, which can be translated into a core 
phenomenological question: where am I situated in relation to what I see? It 
is intriguing how we usually recognize and contemplate the world through 
windows, particularly the physical ones from our own homes. Working as 
perception holdovers, windows underpin our memory and subsist as key 
points in our personal timelines. Pinto’s open/closed window to the world 
unfolds an accurate translation of the wounded bodies living in between. The 
airplane, true synonym of a no man’s land, expresses, more metaphorically 
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than analogically, an idea of struggle to locate one’s own body, showing us 
the non-place par excellence where the dying body is condemned to inhabit. 
Nowadays accessibility to the shocking images of real death is producing, 
unquestionably, new mind-sets towards exposure, violence and the abrupt 
conversion from being to nonbeing. The revolting and nauseating terrorist 
videos of ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), in which foreign hostages are 
beheaded in front of the camera while staring at it, might play a huge role in 
the way death is being understood as unnatural and unfair. The current state 
of death’s denial is subsequently stressed, since what lies beneath the 
disturbing surface is the fragility of the human body and an overall sense of 
evilness that resists any idea of acceptance or linearity. Other online videos, 
such as the accident at Indore, India, where a five-member family is swept 
away by a flood, falling from Patalpani’s waterfall, produce similar effects 
regarding the imperious lethality of nature itself. The falling bodies work, 
once again, as an accurate translation of the disquieting unknown towards 
the end of life: a fall into the void, registered from the top of the waterfall and 
not allowing us to see, thus, what happens afterwards. Two of the family 
members managed to survive, while the other three drowned. In a world 
enduringly reminding us that nature kills in apparently arbitrary choices and 
leaving behind visual evidences, our self-defence mechanisms concerning 
mortality tend to be almost continuously activated.  
Even though these media registers of death are not films, in the sense they 
do not conventionally integrate a wide-ranging and pre-established set of 
criteria or organized narrative, it is becoming more and more challenging to 
circumscribe boundaries around the complex and open concept of the 
cinematic.26 An ontological sense of the materiality of the moving-image is 
starting to be invalid if we consider the spread of the digital, translating 
everything into zeros and ones and democratizing the filmic apparatus; the 
gigantic impact of the film theatre does not seem to be imposingly taken into 
account when it comes to any screen mediated confrontation between the 
viewer and a real death; and even the Deleuzian idea of cinema as something 
drastically different from natural perception tends to lose its meaning when 
discussing the phenomenology of image and death, since death as a screen 
event linked to veracity seems to fight, independently from exhibition 
formats, the natural perception of the world. In point of fact, death is an open 
concept that defies human perception. These new media images, by being 
images that are already there, work simultaneously as a countermovement 
and a striking visual wound impossible to escape. 
Regardless of the fact that the film viewer’s magnitude of self-awareness or 
shocking effects cannot be measured, I argue that it is within the aesthetic 
experience that the importance of the film form regarding the discernment 
of death and dying can be found. In any case, in each qualitative analysis, and 
even if every moving-image has its own codes, it is imperative to understand 
that, facing today’s visual diversity, any filmic experience exists 
simultaneously within and beyond the cinematic. If the documentary should 
be rethought, according to Tom Gunning and in the light of media 
archaeology, as a post-actualities practice, shaped and influenced by                                                         
26 Even though the present speech constitutes a truism in the contemporary world, I 
find necessary to update the on-going debate regarding the colossal influence of new 
media images of death and dying and respective accessibility. Regarding the 
disappearance of the photographic ontology in the art in film, the advent of multiple 
exhibition windows, the social and cultural consumption of images and consequential 
discussion around the death of cinema, see for example D. N. Rodowick’s The Virtual 
Life of Film (Cambridge, Massachusetts: University of Harvard Press, 2007).  
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previous modes of nonfiction, then hybrid and contemporary documentary 
forms must reassess intermediality and the multiple and simultaneous 
referents of a fast-paced lived-world. In other words, other visual registers 
outside the filmic form must continuously be taken into account, considering 
not just their influence on documentary aesthetics, but also the fact they are 
sowed within the film viewer’s cognizance and allegorical language. A re-
evaluation that would not forget, rather rethink, “the tradition of 
documentary, a tradition filled with both beauties and terrors, scenarios of 
power and resistance, turning on the act of looking and the creation of the 
view.”27 
Even if the representation of death and dying is a salient theme of much 
scholarly attention, I argue that the documentary and media examples 
presented above are still overlooked and underrated by the contemporary 
film viewer, deserving therefore a deeper debate and subconsequential 
visibility. The vast majority of the presented models deal with death as a 
cinematic motif linked to the grotesque, the carnage, the trauma or the 
abrupt interruption of life, never developing an intimate relationship with 
the dying process or the dying body but with its causes, consequences or 
neighbouring territories. Nonetheless, they all bring subjects – from the 
lifeless figure to human signification, from the falling bodies to voyeurism – 
that will rebound throughout the following pages, echoing interrogations and 
images, by correspondence or antagonism, while contaminating the filmic 
phenomenology of dying.  
 
1.3 – WHY FILM PHENOMENOLOGY?  
 
IN PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION, Maurice Merleau-Ponty defines 
phenomenology as the study of essences, applying it to a world existing prior 
to reflection and that is always lived. The definition of phenomenology is, 
nonetheless, and according to his words, far from any resolution, remaining 
permanently “in a nascent state, as a problem and as a promise,” 28  a 
suggested and suggestive notion which “most important accomplishment is, 
it would seem, to have joined an extreme subjectivism with an extreme 
objectivism through its concept of the world or of rationality.”29  
Ponty prioritizes the importance of oneself’s body, considering it the tool that 
establishes a point of view upon the world. I would like to accentuate this 
idea of our own body as “one of the objects of the world,” 30  since what 
interests me is a body that is simultaneously part of the world but also adds 
to the world, interacting with it, creating it, updating it and, ultimately, 
generating signification. Applying Ponty’s concept to the phenomenology of 
image and death is not only valid but also predominantly consonant. Even 
though we cannot experience our own death, in the sense that a live – and 
lived – body is indispensable to experience the world, the recognition of 
death and dying can work as “the Sinn-gebung [sense-giving], the active 
                                                        
27  Tom Gunning, “Before Documentary: Early Nonfiction Films and the ‘View’ 
Aesthetic”, Uncharted Territory: Essays on Early Nonfiction Film, ed. Daan Hertogs 
and Nico de Klerk (Amsterdam: Stichting Nederlands Filmmuseum, 1997), 24. 
28 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans., Donald A. Landes 
(New York: Routledge, 2012), 8. 
29 Ibid., 21. 
30 Ibid., 99. 
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signifying operation that might be the definition of consciousness”31 in our 
Lebenswelt - the lived world -, as outlined by Edmund Husserl, the first pillar 
of the school of phenomenology. Furthermore, the fact that Ponty’s world is 
an entity that is lived and not thought-out does not exclude, to my mind, the 
possibility of prospection and sense of future time as derived from the 
experience of the real and complementary to it, being through subjectivity 
and intersubjectivity that we can describe anticipations, fears and desires 
towards life and death.  
Ponty reminds us that “we must – precisely in order to see the world and to 
grasp it as a paradox – rupture our familiarity with it, and this rupture can 
teach us nothing except the unmotivated springing forth of the world.”32  The 
unsparing constitution of death and dying as an indexically real event can 
produce a shocking, visceral effect on the film viewer, working precisely as a 
separation from any kind of continuity, a hindrance to the permanent 
unfolding of life and its circumscriptions.  
How can we represent and perceive an idea as complex as the idea of 
mortality within documentary cinema, and, particularly, within a film as 
Frederick Wiseman’s Near Death? Film phenomenology, so linked to the 
concepts of consciousness, subjectivity, affectivity and immersion, allows 
new understandings of the disconcerting moment of encounter between the 
film viewer and the dying body in documentary cinema. As mentioned by 
Frank P. Tomasulo, phenomenology and film could work hand in hand, 
having in mind the latter “is so dependent on the explicitly visual experiences 
of time, space, perception, signification, and human signification.”33 
Underpinning my point of view, together with Merlau-Ponty’s existential 
phenomenology, is Vivian Sobchack’s semiotic phenomenology of death in 
documentary film as described in Inscribing Ethical Space: Ten 
Propositions on Death, Representation, and Documentary, considering that 
“such a phenomenology of representation attempts to describe, thematize, 
and interpret death as it appears on the screen and is experienced by us as 
indexically real, rather than iconically or symbolically affective.”34 According 
to the author, death works as a threat presented to representation, being 
commonly regarded as an unexpected and erratic happening if reconsidering 
that our exposure to violent depictions of death has been amplified. Death is, 
in our culture, “the sign that ends all signs,” “the ultimate act of semiosis,” 
being an occurrence that concomitantly embodies the development of sign 
fabrication and the end of representation, always inventive, eccentric and 
appalling.35 
Death as a screen event can produce inner displacements, forcing us to lose 
our affective coordinates. As Sobchack reminds us, “the representation of the 
event of death is an indexical sign of what is always in excess of 
representation, and beyond the limits of coding and culture: Death 
confounds all codes.”36 Having in mind that the “nonbeing is not visible” and 
that “it can only be pointed to, the terminus of its indexical sign forever off-                                                        
31 Ibid., lxxv. 
32 Ibid., 14. 
33  Frank P. Tomasulo, “Phenomenology: Philosophy and Media Theory – An 
Introduction”, Quarterly Review of Film and Television 12, no. 3 (1990), 2. 
34 Vivian Sobchack, “Inscribing Ethical Space: Ten Propositions on Death, 
Representation and Documentary”, Quarterly Review of Film Studies 9, no. 4 (1984), 
283. 
35 Ibid., 286. 
36 Ibid., 287. 
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screen, forever out-of-sight,” the task of exploring death as a screen event 
resists definite answers and concrete demarcations.37 
Sobchack analogously underlines a lack of representation of death in 
documentary films, as opposed to the concentration of its depiction within 
cinematic fictions – which “tend to satisfy us.”38 It seems that “the narrative 
representation of death is experienced as a visualization in the abstract, 
whereas the documentary representation of death seems experienced as a 
visualization of the real.” 39 An indexical reality, one might affirm, which 
requires ethical justifications, social acceptance, visual legitimation and 
other valid permissions. The contemporary denial of death pushes its limited 
perceptibility into the shadows, silencing it and forcing it to cultural consent 
every time it comes to light. A semiotic phenomenology of death and dying 
in documentary cinema could help us to understand the contradictions of the 
film viewer in relating to a multiplicity of signs that struggle to be visible in 
the corporeal world of representation, recognizing physical and 
psychological impacts and describing affective experiences between fear and 
the desire to know, feel and see. However, the documentary exemplification 
of the dying body remains more accessible to the human eye, constituting the 
film phenomenology of dying a more graspable area than the line of the 
horizon constituted by death. As Malin Wahlberg affirms, “the most 
provoking figure of death is not the image of a dead body but a body 
transforming into corpse.”40 The dying body, as an in between still graspable 
by the visible signs and as a halting pose, can allow an intellectual and 
physical engagement by the film viewer that death, as an immaterial concept, 
cannot admit.  
Regarding the issue of indexicality and veracity, one of the examples 
highlighted by Vivian Sobchack is the real death of a rabbit in the fictive 
narrative of The Rules of the Game (La Règle du Jeu, Jean Renoir, 1939). The 
sequence seems to exist on the other side of fictional realm of killings, where 
death is “a commonplace – rather than taboo – visual event.” Contextualized 
by his or her own cultural and ethical knowledge, the film viewer understands 
the death of the rabbit as a rupture that “exceeds the narrative code which 
communicates it.” 41  An even more striking, updated and contemporary 
paradigm of this effect can be seen in the Argentinian film The Dead (Los 
Muertos, Lisandro Alonso, 2004). During a journey back home, Vargas, the 
main character, kills a goat with his own hands, slaying it with a machete. 
From the slitted throat to the blood stream, the slow death of the animal – 
filmed in real time and without editing – becomes, simultaneously with the 
initial visceral shock, an unbearable experience for the viewer. In Near 
Death, dying entails a slow process. The dying body, in which death acts from 
the inside to the outside and never the opposite, is an entity that 
simultaneously extends time and has no time.  
It is important to underline my agreement with Sobchack’s words when 
affirming that semiotic phenomenology is “necessarily culturally informed 
and historicized.” 42  It is not a coincidence that Philippe Ariès’ historical 
approach opens the present thesis, categorizing our attitudes towards death 
through delineated times (from the Middle Ages to the present), demarcated                                                         
37 Ibid., 287. 
38 Ibid., 287. 
39 Ibid., 290. 
40 Wahlberg, Documentary Time: Film and Phenomenology, 47. 
41 Sobchack, “Inscribing Ethical Space: Ten Propositions on Death, Representation and 
Documentary”, 293. 
42 Ibid., 283. 
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places (the Western societies), and a specific arch (from acceptance to 
denial). It is due to the recognition that a spectator in cinema is always a 
prisoner of his or her own context and time that I tend to reject Allan 
Casabier’s theories of transcendental phenomenology in Film and 
Phenomenology: Toward a Realist Theory of Cinematic Representation, 
underpinned by an acknowledgement of a consciousness that exists beyond 
the film viewer’s schemata. Even though I am supportive of Casabier’s idea 
that there are “advantages of a phenomenological account of the 
documentary form,”43 I am not absolutely convinced by the impression of a 
filmic experience not linked to the spectator’s beliefs, languages, 
susceptibilities, social-historical backgrounds and inner politics of the 
feeling, so ontologically related to experiences and anticipations, anxieties 
and desires. As Wahlberg puts it: “If so, how is it that when talking about film 
we often disagree on what was shown? How can we neglect that perception 
involves interpretation and constructed frames through which we react to 
sensory qualities as well as semantic information and symbolic signs?” 44 
Nevertheless, I agree that death as a filmic motif can blend and muddle the 
most intimate coordinates and inner outlines, defending that dying is, 
particularly, made of signs that brings us together, not as universal 
knowledge or experience, but as collective recognition, intuition and fatality. 
Additionally, I also resist Casabier’s notion of cinema as discovery of the 
realm presented in front of him, since what I defend is the cinematic 
representation of death and dying as an indexically real reorganization of the 
signs. In other words, a rediscovery of the already known problematized by 
an oblivious request of the film viewer – remind me – always standing 
between the wish to recall and the fear to know any potential truth.  
Following that line of thought, I position myself on the side of Vivian 
Sobchack’s vision of the embodied nature and dialectical structure of the film 
experience defended in The Address of the Eye: A Phenomenology of Film 
Experience, being stimulated by the same “desire to cry out my inherent 
qualification of the world of essences and universals” and accepting “my 
existential particularity in a world I engage and share with others.” What is 
at stake is, as in Merlau-Ponty, a body that is not only part of the world but 
also adds to the world.45 
I suggest that the phenomenology of dying does not promote alienation but rather a 
hard experience of labour and new attitudes towards the moving image, since 
mortality is embodied in a human consciousness that tries to permanently deny it. 
The language of death always reveals itself to us as a new language and a reinvented 
collection of signs, trying to find a voice and a graphic vocabulary to express its own 
void. After all, “death is a motif that is both excessively visual and impossible to 
represent.”46 Nonetheless, having in mind that “a film is an act of seeing that makes 
itself seen, an act of hearing that makes itself heard” 47  and that, as defined by 
Sobchack, the intersubjective foundation of objective cinematic communication has 
its origin in shared structures of embodied experience and ways of being-in-the-
world, the image of dying is an affective and effective perceptual modality connecting 
the I and the other in our inextricable knot and, particularly, in our common and 
inexorable mortality. There is no other life event capable of establishing so many                                                         
43 Allan Casabier, Film and Phenomenology. Toward a Realistic Theory of Cinematic 
Representation (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 147. 
44  Malin Wahlberg, Figures of Time. On the Phenomenology of Cinema and 
Temporality (Stockholm University, 2003), 111. 
45 Vivian Sobchack, The Address of the Eye: A Phenomenology of Film Experience 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991), xiii-xv. 
46 Wahlberg, Documentary Time: Film and Phenomenology, 47. 
47 Sobchack, The Address of the Eye: A Phenomenology of Film Experience, 3. 
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existential intersections between human beings and activating collectively our 
embodied vision and attentiveness.  
However, and since I do not consider a consciousness beyond the film viewer’s 
personal schemata, I share Vivian Sobchack’s binary proposal of an I/eye of the screen 
and an I/eye constituted by the film viewer. Even though I understand the framed 
event of death and dying in cinema as the most capable of destroying the walls 
splitting human perception from cinematic perception, confounding the codes and 
relocating personal coordinates, there seems to exist a mutual space that, as Sobchack 
insinuates, is always negotiated. This occurs, primarily, due to the proposition “’There, 
where I am not,’ as the space consciously and bodily inhabited and lived by an ‘other’ 
whose experience of being-in-the-world, however anonymous, is not precisely 
congruent with the viewer’s own.”48 What interests me in this suggestion, always 
focusing on the classical topic of image and death, is the link between film, filmmaker 
and film viewer, based on their “capacity to localize and unify (or ‘centre’) the invisible 
(…) and make it visible”49 within the rules and criteria of their own intersubjective 
communication. On the reversibility of cinematic expression and expression, Vivian 
Sobchack writes:  
The film’s vision and my own do not conflate, but meet in the sharing of a 
world and constitute an experience that is not only intrasubjectively 
dialectical, but also intrasubjectively dialogical. Although there are moments 
in which our views may become congruent in the convergence of our interest 
(never of our situation), there are also moments in which our views conflict; 
our values, interests, prospects, and projects differ; something is not 
understood or is denied even as it is visible and seen. Cinematic vision, then, 
is never monocular, is always doubled, is always the vision of the two viewing 
subjects materially and consciously inhabiting, signifying, and sharing a world 
in a manner at once universal and particular, a world that is mutually visible 
but hermeneutically negotiable.50 
To confront the mortality of the other on the screen implies, always, a 
confrontation with our own mortality, which is, therefore, ontologically linked to 
the end of monopolarity. Subsequently, by attempting to see through the eyes of 
the other, identity and consciousness are activated and reopened to new 
readjustments. This process, nevertheless, never happens before an inner struggle 
that does not reveal its defensive strategies, its filters or its measurements. In that 
sense, I occupy an in between dimension where cinema is more than “one of these 
intellectual robots”51, as outlined by Jean Epstein when defending the difference 
between the machine and the human mind. Nonetheless, they are not accurately 
analogous, since my (dis)enchantment towards cinema departs from a rupture 
from my perceptual and existential modalities, regrouping the codes of the 
already lived with the ones of the yet to live.  
Dying as a real screen event is the ultimate paradox, since what is at stake is 
concomitantly the rediscovery of a certainty – the one of my own mortality – 
and the impossibility of reason or epistemological orientations – since it 
constitutes a void that exists beyond my own body and consciousness. In this 
scenario, the dying person and the falling body in between are the ultimate 
indications of a sphere still impassable to us, since it is simultaneously 
mediated and mediator, vanishing subject and announcing object.                                                          
48 Ibid., 10. 
49 Ibid., 21. 
50 Ibid., 24. 
51 Jean Epstein, L’intelligence de une machine (1946), Jean Epstein, Critical essays 
and new translations, ed. Sarah Keller and Jason N. Paul (Amsterdam: University of 
Amsterdam press, 2011), 310. 
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Chapter 2  
On Near Death (Frederick Wiseman, 1989) 
 
2.1. THE HOSPITAL AS MICROCOSM OF THE IMPERSONAL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 – Boston’s Beth Israel Hospital, Near Death (Frederick Wiseman,1989) 
 
 
DEATH IN THE HOSPITAL is no longer the occasion of a ritual ceremony, over 
which the dying person presides amidst his assembled relatives and friends. 
Death is a technical phenomena obtained by a cessation of care, a cessation 
determined in a more or less avowed way by a decision of the doctor and the 
hospital team. Indeed, in the majority of the cases, the dying person has 
already lost consciousness. Death has been dissected, cut to bits by a series 
of little steps, which finally makes it impossible to know which step was the 
real death, the one in which consciousness was lost, or the one in which 
breathing stopped. All these little silent deaths have replaced and erased the 
great dramatic act of death, and no one any longer has the strength or 
patience to wait over a period of weeks for a moment which has lost a part of 
its meaning.52 
 
Even if Near Death has no voiceover, the words of Philippe Ariès can echo as 
murmurs throughout Frederick Wiseman’s documentary film. In the aseptic 
white rooms and corridors of Boston’s Beth Israel Hospital, life and death are 
discussed between the wishes of the terminal ill patients and families and the 
possibilities and opinions given by the doctors. During the 358 minutes of 
the film, we observe the quotidian of a Medical Intensive Care Unit and the 
decision-making processes on life-sustaining treatments, following the 
ethical, personal, legal, psychological, religious and medical confrontations.                                                          
52 Philippe Ariès, Western Attitudes Toward Death: From the Middle Ages to the 
Present, 88-89. 
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Always surrounded by machines, tubes and ventilators, we listen to 
discussions over restrained breathing, explanations about intubation 
procedures, choked voices trying to be heard and repeated phone calls 
revealing frustrating, anger-provoking prognosis. Occasionally, some 
vocalised words bring us to life – oxygen, heartbeat, blood stream – but the 
film depicts a world of uncertainties: “We don’t know what do to”/”I don’t 
know what to do” constitutes the main binary relation between professionals 
and the involved relatives.  
 
The first moments of the film seem to hamper the process of immersion that 
will, later on, become its core structure. In one of the hospital rooms, a Rabi 
says to a motionless woman’s body: “Can you hear me? (…) We won’t leave 
you alone, okay?”, additionally mentioning the fact that her son is coming 
from Chicago to be by her side. On the following shot, under a different light 
setting that does not allow us to apprehend specific time coordinates, a 
doctor auscultates the heart of the same woman with a stethoscope: “Okay, 
she’s dead, 10h43.” To see one of these silent deaths that Ariès defined, 
testifying the invisible transformation from being to nonbeing, underscores 
death as a merciless event capable of erasing human signification.  
The conversations of the hospital staff on responsibility, manipulation of life 
and criteria regarding future directions of the patients’ conditions, even if 
habitually professional and serious, sporadically achieve levels of lightness 
which seem to point towards human indifference, presenting the hospital as 
a contemporary microcosm of the impersonal. Even though the ambition is 
continuously to maximize the comfort of the patient, improving the function 
of the body and discover the best solutions, all of the professionals 
surrounded by death seem, at intervals, to forget death itself, deconstructing 
it into codes, concepts and contradictory definitions between the clinical, the 
physiological and the existential.  
Around the middle of the film, a doctor mentions the word purgatory. The 
hospital represents, ultimately, the outlying territory of these bodies 
permanently in between, imprisoned amid life and death, trapped among the 
never-ending corridors and claustrophobic rooms that form a non-place par 
excellence. It is not accidental that Wiseman depicts recurrently the daily life 
within the hospital through reflexes on the windows’ glass or through 
backlight framings, eradicating at times the physical qualities of the 
labyrinthine space. Dying becomes, phenomenologically, reflection and 
infection. As in the interior of a prison, every action doubles its meaning: 
capturing an eye closing after anaesthesia produces a movement as intense 
as ambiguous, always in the borderline between passing away and survival, 
always composing death as a Russian roulette.  
When Philippe Ariès discusses the displacement of the site of death from 
one’s home to the hospital, he defends that “one no longer goes to or will go 
to the hospital to be healed, but for the specific purpose of dying.” 53 
Emphasising the loneliness of contemporary death and the prevailing 
repression of humanity, the author concludes that “emotions must be 
avoided both in the hospital and everywhere in society. One does not have 
the right to become emotional other than in private, that is to say, secretly.”54  
                                                        
53 Ibid., 88. 
54 Ibid., 89. 
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Frederick Wiseman, as a remarkable filmmaker that has filmed institutions 
throughout his entire life, manages to depict the hospital of Near Death as a 
location that matches Ariès’ analysis while, at intervals, deconstructing it. 
How to introduce life in a place of death, re-entering the human and 
transforming the dying body into dying person? Firstly, by the decision of 
following four particular patients – John Gavin (72), Bernice Factor (70), 
Manuel Cabra (33) and Charlie Sperazza (73) – offering the film viewer the 
time to understand particular conditions and recognizable faces. Through 
that shrewd strategy, Wiseman exterminates anonymity and indistinctness, 
spawning familiarization with each patient and respective surroundings. 
Secondly, by presenting a figure such as Dr. Taylor, foregrounded by the 
humanity of his voice and pose, owning an attitude that highly contrasts with 
a global sense of impersonality. Thirdly, by showing several moments of 
intimacy. Among these instants that go beyond the institutional and social 
requested interactions are the sweetened humour of Charlie Sperazza’s wife 
after his well-succeeded surgery, the endearment of Mrs. Factor’s husband 
explaining that her swallow hands are just temporary, or a close-up of Dr. 
Taylor’s hand holding the hand of a patient’s relative. Moments linked to 
image-affect, which seem to dismantle the social constructions depicted and 
alleviate the dismay provoked by the confrontation with death.  
Disguised under an observational mode of filmmaking, Wiseman is an 
auteur. By offering a vision that is confrontational and always conscious 
while shooting, Wiseman fits, more than any notion of direct cinema, the 
criteria of the “interventional gaze” described by Vivian Sobchack when 
defining ethical representations of a visual encounter with death. 55  The 
camera of Wiseman addresses more than a distant look of the filmed reality, 
rather reconstructing it with meticulously measured and subtle strategies. 
The camera does not participate in an uncompromised register: it 
incorporates the interactions and zooms in into the unseen environment and 
experience of slow death. If Near Death is shocking, moving and engaging, it 
is because we are not simply observing dying bodies but existential portraits 
telling life stories that are, irrevocably, close to the final chapter. What is at 
stake is a collaborative effort, from the one who sees – Wiseman, the film 
viewer – to the one being seen – the dying person, always individualized and 
volatile.  
I have argued that the hospital is still acknowledged today as a microcosm of 
the impersonal, a transitory space without a memory and capable of 
expunging humanity through wintriness and callousness. Nonetheless, it is 
also within the aesthetic experience of film and its immanent possibilities of 
framing unfolding events that new complex layers can emerge, 
deconstructing simplistic generalizations, privileging the why over the how, 
preserving instants, metamorphosing the detached into the attached and 
altering the microcosm into the cosmic. The poetics of the space, particularly 
in relation to the phenomenology of dying, are always composed by shifting 
and shady landscapes.   
The idea for Near Death came from Richard C. Pasternak, director of Beth Israel’s 
cardiac care unit, “who for many years had been concerned with the public’s 
inaccurate, if not romanticized, conception of what goes on in intensive-care units.” 
The film was aired as a six-hour show by Public Broadcasting Service stations – “the 
longest uninterrupted documentary in PBS history” – in order to preserve Wiseman’s                                                         
55 Sobchack, “Inscribing Ethical Space: Ten Propositions on Death, Representation, 
and Documentary”, 296. 
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intentions. The director revealed that the shooting of Near Death “as ‘an amazing 
personal experience’, during which he came to terms with his own mortality.”56 
  
2.2 DYING BODIES AND THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF DYING 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3 – On the other side, Near Death (Frederick Wiseman,1989) 
 
 
WHILE FOLLOWING the medical and human condition of the first patient, 
John Gavin, we also witness conversations between Dr. Taylor and Gavin’s 
family. In one of those moments, the doctor talks with Gavin’s wife while, 
behind the glass window of his room, the patient sleeps. Even though the 
camera is moving, the main framing position of that segment consists of a 
perfect diagonal line, starting with Dr. Taylor in the foreground, 
accompanied by the attentive wife of the patient and, finally, finishing with 
John Gavin. Constituting a blurry image in the background, his body is 
almost blended with the landscape until the wife turns around to see him and 
his horizontal body becomes focused. The framing works as the perfect 
translation of the cinematic representation of the dying body that traverses, 
on the surface, the documentary film: bodies that are not entirely part of the 
world of the living; realistic depictions of half-ghosts in between dimensions, 
slowly being left behind, silenced by the glass walls, existentially denied due 
to the inexorable future they preconize. What is at stake is, one might say, a 
deconstructed mise-en-abyme, since the place of John Gavin will be, in time, 
replaced by the other two subjects that compose the image and, irrevocably, 
by the film viewer. I argue that the consciousness of mortality invoked by 
Near Death, always inclusive, limited and self-reflexive, exceeds the film 
screen, reminding the film viewer of his or her wait in line and corresponding 
position as the ultimate point of the diagonal. What is produced is, as 
Sobchack affirms, a technologically mediated consciousness, which is also, 
through the existentially functional body of the film, an immediate 
experience of consciousness of the expressed world.57  
                                                        
56 Donald C. Drake, “Tv's 'Near Death' Experience Cruel Choices Must Be Made In An 
Intensive-care Unit, And Filmmaker Frederick Wiseman Shows Them. But He Also 
Captures Courage And Compassion In A Remarkable Work On Channel 12 Today”, The 
Inquirer (January 28, 1990): http://articles.philly.com/1990-01-
28/entertainment/25906038_1_intensive-care-unit-high-tech-medicine-titicut-
follies (accessed May 25, 2015). 
57 Vivian Sobchack, The Address of the Eye, 168. 
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Natural death, as observed in Near Death, does not allow any sense of 
naturalness, since the agitated and confused persons we see do not seem to 
consent death. “What is your sense of what is going on?”, a doctor asks to one 
of the patients. Through a visibly worried, frightened face we recognize a 
consciousness that is never far-reaching, serene or non-violent. The 
expressive movements and responses of those bodies are linked to anxiety, a 
deconstructed fear which is the source of the visible affectivity. A 
deconstructed variation of the self-aware state shared by the film viewer even 
though, as Vivian Sobchack affirms, “dying and death, particularly in 
documentary film, cannot be represented and made visible on the screen 
with an exactitude experienced as ‘fullness’.”58 It is necessary to realize that, 
due to the impracticality of death as a repeatable experience, any conceivable 
consciousness is always partial, restricted, based on inferences beyond 
reason and knowledge. Nevertheless, if our relationship with the unknown is 
always subjective and unenlightened, the physicality of the dying reveals 
itself to us in a more apparent and measurable mode.  
In Near Death we are not dealing with collective atrocity or unidentified 
bodies, but with disturbing and disturbed bodies that also exist between the 
weird and the attractive. Nonetheless, as we have previously seen, Wiseman 
metamorphoses the dying body into dying person, using his camera to create 
a personal and intimate sphere. The body becomes portrait, life-story, and 
the uncompromising spectacle shifts into an attentive affective cartography. 
If Wiseman’s film is so genuinely heart-rending, it is due to the embodied 
and synchronised contradiction of people alive within immobilized bodies.  
It is therefore necessary to determine the paradoxes and possibilities of the 
phenomenological images of dying when confronted with the 
phenomenological messages of death, exploring the emotional data that can 
be originated from the dying as a visual and external process. I argue that the 
filmic mise-en-scène and its aesthetic qualities constitute a more helpful 
device to decode the existential questions to which so many filmmakers 
permanently return. How does the dying body, in its ephemeral aspect and 
as the most poignant of the indexical signs, create a moment of encounter 
with the film viewer able to produce emotional and intellectual impact? How 
does the dying body reflect dying as an intimate proximity to death?   
During one of the sequences of the film, a doctor points a lantern to the eyes 
of a patient, looking for body responses. Later on, at the morgue of the 
hospital, a dead body covered with a white blanket epitomizes inactivity. 
Ultimately, “the moment of death can only be represented in a visible and 
vigorous contrast between two states of the physical body: the body as lived-
body, intentional and animated – and the body as corpse, as flesh 
unintended, inanimate, static.”59 I argue, however, that the most shocking 
and disquieting effects of mortality in contemporary societies do not have 
their origin in necrophobic attitudes but, as Sobchack affirms, in “the visible 
mortification of or violence to the existential, intentional, and representable 
lived-body which stands as the index of dying.”60 In other words, it is the 
index of dying, not the index of death, the foundation of our abhorrence 
towards the filmic representation of human mortality, the same causality 
underpinning the dualistic contradiction between self-awareness and denial.  
                                                        
58 Sobchack, “Inscribing Ethical Space: Ten Propositions on Death, Representation 
and Documentary”, 287. 
59 Ibid., 287. 
60 Ibid., 287. 
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As William F. May affirms, a man “not only has a body, he is his body.”61 How 
is the dying body represented in Near Death and how does it describe a 
phenomenology of dying? The first face we see belongs to an old man gasping 
for air, as a fish out of water. The atmosphere is baldly established: these are 
bodies trying to survive, captured in an ominous realm between life and 
death. Apart from Mr. Cabra, 33 years old, the patients exposed throughout 
the documentary are elderly. Their faces are thus closer to the index of dying 
that forms the core structure of the film, correspondingly linking the film 
viewer to cinematic politics of the feeling. About the human face, Alphonso 
Lingis writes:  
It is peculiarly on faces that death is visible. To look upon faces is to look upon 
expression, moods, attitudes, solicitations. When this vibrancy and volatility is 
effaced by death, the face is vacant and desolate, as the surfaces of things cannot 
be. To look upon faces is always to sense this death that is latent, visible in the 
frail freshness of youth, the wrinkles of age.62 
Mouths breathing heavily, wrinkled skin, dark circles under the 
eyes, matted hair,  scared eyes wide open: mortal faces covered in 
tubes, oxygen masks and nasal cannulas, half-awake under death 
as a hovering imminent menace. I argue that the face is the 
source of expressive recognition, a map of the sensible that 
grasps an emotional cartography and the coordinates of the self. 
The work of an artist as Francis Bacon – for example, in Three 
Studies For a Portrait of Lucian Freud  – is imperative in order 
to underline the significance of the human face: when 
confronting a distorted, disfigured face, we lose the matching 
signs towards identification and the correspondences to 
selfhood’s performativity,  stepping into the dimension of the 
unrecognizable and into a certain kind of void.  
Elizabeth Cowie affirms that “through the other’s face I become 
aware of a world experienced by the other.” 63 Considering that 
documentaries offer “mise-en-scènes of desire and of imagining 
that enable identification even while, or rather because, it  asserts 
itself  as real,” 64 one might affirm that the faces of Wiseman’s film  
enclose our own doubts and anxieties regarding the proximity of 
the irrevocable moment of death. There is,  undeniably, a innate 
“desire for knowledge, a wish to know, founded in the wish to 
know the desire of the other.” 65 In other words: What is inside 
the mind of the other? How does he/she experience, feel and 
think of the world? When does one’s desires and fears match my 
own? If I  believe in film phenomenology as a way to end 
monopolarity,  it  is because I consider these questions to be the 
central key to stimulate and enhance our perceptual modalities, 
activating self-awareness towards the other and, subsequently, 
towards selfhood.  
Following a parallel line of thought, Margaret Gibson says that 
we live with the knowledge that we are going to die, living this                                                         
61 William F. May, “The Sacral Power of Death in Contemporary Experience,” Death in 
American Experience, ed. Arien Mack (New York: Shocken Books, 1973), 116.  
62 Alphonso Lingis, Foreign Bodies (London: Routledge, 1994), 167. 
63 Elizabeth Cowie, “Documentary Desire: Seeing For Ourselves and Identifying in 
Reality”, Recording Reality, Desiring the Real (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2011), 92. 
64 Ibid., 87. 
65 Ibid., 89. 
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knowing through the face of the others. Faces that work as an 
expressive diagram where, according to Gibson, character is 
formed and performed, fading and dissolving. 66  Borrowing 
Aphonso Lingi’s title to describe the cinematic death scene – or, 
as she affirms, unscene – as an hectic moment which brings 
together “a community of those who have nothing in common,” 67 
Gibson emphasizes that “representations of death may be 
experienced in a profound and moving way that fleetingly unites 
emotionally disconnected strangers and separate 
consciousnesses.” 68 Even though I have defended previously a 
film viewer’s cognition linked to one’s subjective schemata, I 
argue that death as an indexically real screen event, as an 
exceptional and unequal phenomenon, can trigger new layers of 
perception and intersubjectivity,  defying pre-established 
sensitivities and emotional hierarchies.  
Despite the slow deterioration of the dying body, what is 
represented in Near Death  are human figures possessing a 
physicality corresponding to my own. Sobchack reminds us, 
ultimately, that “the act of seeing also suggests that the source 
of its activity shares a material equivalence with that which 
appears to it  in the world it  presents.” 69 In that sense, dying as a 
screen event is capable of bedevilling and generating a deceptive 
effect of disembodiment, which is, on the contrary, a more 
authentic acknowledgement of one’s own body.  
The dying bodies of Near Death  generate a poignant and 
paradoxical face-to-face encounter. On the one hand, we know 
the person within the body is still conscious, capable of 
producing erratic gestures and sounds linked to the natural 
attitude of the human behaviour. On the other hand, what we see 
are limited bodies, prisons, deteriorating involucres. The 
reversibility process defined by Sobchack is here emphatically 
functional regarding immovability: seeing the dying produces no 
movement on the viewer; hearing the dying produces no sound. 
The embodied nature of film experience unlocks corresponding 
poses.  
In other words, more accurately the ones of Francesco Casetti 
regarding the filmic experience, the subject of mortality as a 
truthful happening within documentary can create something 
more than just reception, interpretation or consumption, but “a 
situation which combines sensory or cognitive ‘excess’  (there is 
something that touches or addresses us, outside the taken-for-
granted) to the ‘recognition’ of what we are exposed to and the 
fact that we are exposed to it (a recognition which makes us 
redefine ourselves and our surroundings).” 70 
Even though Gilles Deleuze affirms that “phenomenology is right 
in assuming that natural perception and cinematographic                                                         
66  Margaret Gibson, “Death Scenes: Ethics of the Face and Cinematic Deaths”, 
Mortality, vol. 6, No. 3 (2001), 307. 
67  Alphonso Lingis, The community of those who have nothing in common, 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994). 
68 Gibson, “Death Scenes: Ethics of the Face and Cinematic Deaths”, 311. 
69 Sobchack, The Address of the Eye, 133. 
70 Francesco Casetti, “Filmic Experience”, Screen, 50, 1 (Spring 2009), 6. 
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perception are qualitatively different,” 71 positioning himself on 
the other side of phenomenology and understanding the 
cinematic form as a machine substantially dissimilar from the 
human mind, I argue that his concept of affection-image is 
intrinsically related to the essence of our interaction with the 
lived world, which film phenomenology continuously attempts to 
evoke and describe. Furthermore, when Deleuze affirms that “the 
affection-image is the close-up, and the close-up is the face,” a 
film such as Near Death  seems to entail new impressions. Being 
the affection-image defined as “both a type of image and a 
component of all images”, a “reflecting and reflected unity,” 72 
Sobchack’s binary configuration of the I/eye of the film and the 
I/eye of the film viewer arises instantaneously in our mind. What 
seems to be at stake is,  ultimately, this reversibility process of 
seeing what I am and being what I see that the filmic form seems 
to allow.  
Considering the face as the centre of the expressed and the close-
up as having an effective reading of the whole film, Deleuze 
declares that we can ask two questions to the face: what are you 
thinking about and what do you sense or feel? In fact, throughout 
Near Death,  those questions are literally posed to the patients: 
“Can you hear me?”; “How are you feeling today?”; “What do you 
think?”; “What is your sense of what is going on?”. Questions that 
cross the screen and rebound within an active film viewer, 
ambiguously transferred to those hospital’s beds and corridors.  
What ensues when we observe a close‐ up within a film? 
According to Balázs, as interpreted by Deleuze, it  abstracts us 
from all spatial‐ temporal coordinates and raises a state of 
Entity, a feeling-thing. The close-up does not operate as 
enlargement and, if  it  indicates a variation of dimension, this is 
a complete transformation: a mutation of movement that stops 
being translation and becomes expression. 73 In order to define 
what creates an affection-image, Deleuze evokes C. S. Peirce’s 
classification of images and signs, distinguishing two categories: 
Firstness and Secondess. Secondness encompasses all the images 
that have a relation to a second, a realm of the real and of the 
existing that contains everything which only exists by opposition 
and duel: exertion-resistance, action‐ reaction; excitation‐
response; situation‐ behavior, individual-milieu, etc.;  whereas 
images categorized within Firstness, defined by Deleuze as pure 
definitions of what an affection-image is,  would be felt rather 
than conceived ,  connected to a new and fresh experience, 
fleeting and nevertheless eternal.  This is,  their innate qualities 
are considered for themselves, without references to anything 
else and composing an immediate consciousness. 74 
 
                                                         
71  Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, trans., Hugh Tomlinson and 
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Fig. 4 – Close-ups of dying, Near Death (Frederick Wiseman,1989) 
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I argue that the close-up of the dying body can inherently grasp Peirce’s 
definition of Firstness and Deleuze’s delineation of affection-image, 
capturing the dreadfulness beyond reason caused by the anticipation of 
mortality. Considering death, as defined by Emanuel Levinas, as “a departure 
toward the unknown, a departure without return, a departure ‘with no 
forwarding address’,”75 the film phenomenology of dying in documentary is 
always a relation without referents. Only possible towards fractional visible 
signs of dying inscribed in the lived-body, from violence to decay, and having 
its climax in the representability of the falling body in between worlds, our 
relation with the death of the other, as accentuated by Levinas, “is not a 
knowledge about the death of the other, nor a experience of that death in its 
particular way of annihilating being. (…) It is an emotion, a movement, a 
disquietude within the unknown.”76 The documentary image of dying, and 
particularly the close-up of its indexical veracity, is a portal amid worlds, a 
passageway to a dimension of immaterialities without any specific space-
time coordinates, concomitantly linked to the materiality and emotional 
authenticity of the lived-world. The dying body is, ultimately, the utmost new 
world, simultaneously grasping and escaping the yet to live that constitutes 
our reduced sense of future.  
 
2.3 DYING VOICES 
 
“The dying die not so much in loneliness, as in silence”77 
Zygmunt Bauman 
            
WHEELED STRETCHERs being pushed across the hospital’s corridors, 
telephones ringing, fast-paced steps, computers’ keyboards, drawers 
being open and closed, papers being signed, televisions, machines, 
ventilators. There seems to exist a permanent background noise, on 
and offscreen, invading and infecting the framings of Near Death.  
However, as explained by Michel Chion in The Voice of Cinema, it is 
the human voice that “hierarchizes everything around it,” 78 through 
a presence that structures the auditory space where it is heard. In 
order to further describe it, Don Ihde, in Listening and Voice: 
Phenomenologies of the Sound, defines the voice as a central 
phenomenon for the human being: “It bears our language without 
which we would perceive differently. Yet outward from this centre, 
voice may also be a perspective, a metaphor, by which we understand 
part of the world itself. For metaphor is to language what perspective 
is to perception, and both are integral to the way in which we 
experience things.”79 The human voice of Near Death departs from 
distinctive human sources, from the patients and their relatives to 
the hospital staff, always entailing as many tones and qualities as the 
possibly matching interactions (patient/family, patient/doctor, 
doctor/doctor etc.).                                                          
75  Emmanuel Levinas, God, Death, and Time, trans., Bettina Bergo (Stanford 
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If in the vast majority of documentary films the human voice belongs 
to the testimonial face or to the narrator, privileging the word and 
speech, Near Death appears to be edified under the non-figurative 
human sounds of the terminally ill patients: coughing, sighs, groans, 
moans, voices dulled by the face masks, gasps, trembled breaths, 
intangible whimpers, lingering silences. Since Wiseman’s 
documentary is intrinsically linked to the subject of the dying, 
establishing it from the very beginning, all of these sounds produced 
by the human voice take us to larger impressions regarding the 
bodies that emanate them, from pain to mental confusion. Having in 
mind the framework of the fictive form, here readapted to the 
documentary film, Barbara Flueckiger writes that “breathing and 
heartbeats (…) represent automatic bodily functions, without which 
no life is possible. They thus indicate not only nearness but (…) life 
as a value to be protected and as the opposite to death.”80 
The speeches of the patients, most of the times inconsistent or close 
to nonsense, juxtapose with an attempt of objectivity, monotony and 
solid limpidness of the words proffered by the nurses and doctors. 
One of the leading cinematic strengths of Wiseman’s work is the 
opportunity to follow the speeches and interactions between people, 
if not entirely, at least to a large extent. From a phenomenological 
perspective of the events, the duration aspects of the film, by 
allowing us to observe and listen to a conjectural whole, reduce any 
sense of manipulation and contribute to an informed and direct 
interpretation between the said and the unsaid of the body language.  
“What is it to listen phenomenologically? It is more that an intense 
and concentrated attention to sound and listening, it is also to be 
aware in the process of the pervasiveness of certain ‘beliefs’ that 
intrude into my attempt to listen ‘to the things themselves’.” 81 
Things essentially related, in the case of Near Death, to the radical 
dichotomy of life and death. Ultimately, to listen to Wiseman’s film 
is also to listen to the asynchronies and contradictions between the 
voices and the bodies, which only seem to find consonance with a 
collective and external countenance of doubt. The prolonged silences 
and anguished hesitations seem to constitute the core sensorial 
engine that more sharply communicates the agonizing inner lives to 
the film viewer. The voice that cannot express, the silent scream, the 
sound made mute by the same body that is trying to produce it: these 
are the true echoes of the dying body. And, as reminded by Don Ihde, 
“with the experience of echo, auditory space is opened up.” 82 
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2.4 THE UNFOLDING OF THE LANDSCAPES 
 
 
 
Fig. 5 – Against the stream, Near Death (Frederick Wiseman,1989) 
 
IN THE FIRST FRAMINGS of Near Death, with the city’s skyline at the distance, 
a group of people inside a racing shell rows against the stream of Charles 
River. Silently, through two beautiful black-and-white shots, a cinematic idea 
is already established: Wiseman’s documentary film is linked to a notion of 
time separated from everyday life – even though it is based, theoretically, on 
the hospital’s quotidian. The wheeled stretchers of Boston’s Beth Israel 
Hospital, as the racing shells, are transports that do not obey the time of the 
downstream, but rather challenge any natural linearity regarding the flow of 
time. Nonetheless, we should allow Maurice Merleau-Ponty to elegantly 
deconstruct the poetic association between water streams and life’s 
temporality: 
 
We say that time passes by or flows by. (…) If time is like a river, then it runs 
from the past toward the present and future. (…) But this famous metaphor 
is in fact quite confused. (…) Time presupposes a view upon time. Thus, time 
is not a like a stream; time is not a fluid substance. (…) The past does not 
drive the present into being, nor does the present drive the future into being; 
the future is not prepared behind the observer, it is planned out in front of 
him, like the storm on the horizon. If the observer is now placed in a boat and 
follows the current, it can certainly be said that he descends with it toward 
his future, but the future is in those new landscapes that await him at the 
estuary, and the flow of time is no longer the stream itself, but is rather the 
unfolding of the landscapes for the moving observer.83 
 
The unfolding of the landscapes, this is, the incessant and inexorable line of 
events that constitute life, between problem-solving and interactivity, 
between mapping out and aleatoric occurrence. We are simultaneously 
dragged by the course of the actions and attracted by the line of the horizon. 
Any stream is, in that sense, innate to our bodies, entailing concomitantly 
magnetism and deterministic movement. According to Ponty, “even if we in 
fact represent the future to ourselves with the help of what we have already 
seen, it remains the case that, in order to project it in front of us, we must 
first have the sense of the future.”84 I argue that the only possible sense of                                                         
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prospection can advent, not from a knowledge, experience or imagined 
sensation towards death, but from a recognition of our own mortality as the 
ultimate rite of passage, as a visible transformation from being to non-being, 
as a fall, from the highest mountain, into a misty void. In any case, it is a 
passage that seems to entail a struggle or a violent movement. As Jean Mitry 
writes, “the flow of time is not similar to the uniform continuity of a river. It 
is more close to a current where the constantly dispersed water wrestles 
against the rocks or retire in cascades.”85 As much as we have the vehement 
impulse for survival, we carry, within our bodies, the intuition of death.  
As Malin Wahlberg reminds us, “the philosophy of time is intrinsically 
related to and even propelled by human’s awareness of his or her death. The 
inevitable limitation of biographical time and the natural yet enigmatic 
transformation of life to death are problems that have always been pivotal in 
human’s reflection on time.”86 The film phenomenology of dying in Near 
Death brings us close to the line of the horizon announcing the irrevocable 
moment of death, allowing us to watch closer and reminding us that we carry 
within a permanently violent state of alarm. I believe personal considerations 
on death and temporality can be metamorphosed, ultimately, into the two 
most radical questions, always intimate, always linked to subjective human 
signification: What is worth living for? What is worth dying for?  
 
2.5 EMBODIED DURATION 
 
“Death: a mortality as demanded by the duration of time” 87 
Emmanuel Levinas 
 
IN The Emergence of Cinematic Time: Modernity, Contingency, the Archive, 
Mary Ann Doane writes that “while photography could fix a moment, the 
cinema made archivable duration itself. In that sense, it was perceived as a 
prophylactic against death, ensuring the ability to ‘see one’s loved ones’ 
gesture and smile long after their deaths. What was registered on film was 
life itself in all its multiplicity, diversity, and contingency,” adding that film 
was understood as “an imprint of time itself (…), a time unharnessed from 
rationalization, a nonteleological time in which each moment can produce 
the unexpected, the unpredictable, and temporality ratifies 
indeterminacy.”88 In fact, Near Death works, more than a register of the time 
of death (the line of the horizon), as an aesthetic experience of dying (the 
unfolding of the landscapes). The dying person, still enclosing the volatile 
and unforeseeable movements that only life entails, is challenged by an 
irreversible event that, despite its expected propinquity, cannot be accurately 
anticipated in time. 
 I argue that Wiseman’s documentary is a film of resistance in enduring 
expansion. In a Western world that continuously attempts to eradicate the 
concept of time, helped by the incessant torrent of production and                                                         
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immortality promoted by economical and socio-political systems, a film such 
as Near Death forces the film viewer to interrupt his or her human march 
among the crowd, looking attentively and considerately at the other and at 
himself or herself while reorganising inner responses to the core question of 
limited time. In several framings of the documentary, the doctors are framed 
with a clock behind their backs, revealing a time that never stops running. 
Instead of an obliteration of the passing time, the time is lived, subsisted, 
embodied by the film viewer and felt in its unbearable heaviness and density, 
a weight directly proportional to the denial of the subject of death.  
 
 
 
Fig. 6 – Clocks, Near Death (Frederick Wiseman,1989) 
 
Doane affirms that “death is perhaps the ultimate trauma insofar as it is 
situated as that which is unassimilable to meaning,” 89  concluding that 
temporality “became the site of the critical control and regulation of 
cinematic meaning.” 90  Considering Wiseman’s decision to respect 
approximately the original duration of the events, and even aware that every 
cut or sequentiality departs us from any fundamentalist realism regarding 
the length of time, I argue that a conscious lack of the need to substantialize 
filmic time dimensions and consequent fluidity produces a double effect. On 
the one hand, it destroys and degrades meaning as imposed by autocratic, 
overthought and overworked structures. On the other hand, almost 
contradictorily, it offers the (im)possibility of meaning to the film viewer, 
orderly looking, seeing and discerning – by this order and not another – 
enforced by time duration to contemplate and perceive the unfolding of the 
landscapes from as many angles as possible. As Merleau-Ponty affirms, 
regarding spatial and temporal perspectives while observing a neighbouring 
house: “If I examine the house attentively and unreflectively, it seems 
eternal, and a sort of wonder emanates from it.”91 Embodying the real-time 
of the dying process can, as with the neighbouring house, generate new 
effects beyond the physical identification of a first glance.  
Following that line of thought, Ponty affirms that analysing time “is not to 
draw out the consequences of a preestablished conception of subjectivity, but 
rather to gain access to its concrete structure through time. If we succeed in 
understanding the subject, this will not be in its pure form, but rather by 
looking for the subject at the intersection of its various dimensions.”92 Only 
by feeling time’s passage and duration becomes possible to map out the ways                                                         
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it unfolds the world around us. Near Death locates the film viewer inside the 
hospital as a place where time is occupied exhaustively in an attempt of 
recognition and self-reflection. Several framings in between the extensive 
dialogues show precisely the long waitings in the hospital’s corridors or 
rooms, the sighs, the suggested inner thoughts of the human figures, 
transferring subjectively the film viewer into the eyes of the other, and vice-
versa. On the surface, moments where nothing happens, wasted times, dead 
times. Nonetheless, a context infected by a time of self-awareness towards 
mortality cannot be an empty time. The time of dying is never a dead time.  
It is imperative to consider film editing as shaper of time duration, since the 
durée of a film never exists per se, being rather the result of several criteria 
and lines of thought. If we manage to observe carefully the human verve 
inside Boston’s Best Israel Hospital Medical Intensive Care Unit, it is also 
due to the decisions in the editing room. Considering that the point of view 
of the film director must be taken into account when evaluating the 
reversibility process of cinematic experience and subsequential search for the 
genesis of the moving-image, we should include Wiseman as the most 
relevant mediator, between the act of filming and the act of montage:  
That is my job as the editor. So much of film editing – or at least editing these 
kinds of documentaries – has absolutely nothing to do with technical issues. 
It has to do with identifying to yourself what you think is happening in the 
rushes. (…) At least fifty percent of editing my films has to do with an attempt 
at an analysis of human behavior. The basic question is “Why?” Why does 
somebody ask for a cigarette at a given moment? Is there an explanation for 
the choice of one word rather than another? What’s the significance of the 
dress that a woman is wearing? (…) Why does someone pause in mid 
sentence? Is there an explanation for a change of tone? I mean, these are the 
kind of evaluations one is always making in ordinary experience when you 
meet people.93 
It is through the editing that Frederick Wiseman finds, ultimately, the inner 
rhythm of the filmed spaces and of the people who inhabit them, posing 
himself the same questions that interest us in existential phenomenology, 
from an interrogative pose to immediate consciousness, from human 
experience to the visible signs of identification. Wahlberg affirms that a “real-
time approximation may be a suitable term for the frame-breaking effect 
caused by a take whose length matches the duration of the filmed event. It, 
however, has less to do with the static camera or the long take as such, than 
with the relative signification of cinematic duration: the various expressive 
functions and psychological effects that figures of extended time may have in 
film.”94 In fact, the intense effect of Near Death’s long takes never generates 
a metafilmic approach or self-reflexivity towards the cinematic apparatus 
and its length, rather creating a profound immersion derived from the 
ambiguities of the subject of death and the contradictions of the dying body, 
as an always incomplete puzzle from which we demand final and definite 
solutions. It is not the impossibility of an answer but our corresponding 
rejection of that impossibility, as beings with an inborn desire for knowledge 
and enlightenment, what sustains our engagement through time, together 
with our insatiable longing for movement and transformation.                                                          
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Many films have experimented the passing of time within the screen, from 
Sleep (Andy Warhol, 1963), following a man, John Giorno, sleeping for six 
hours, to the most recent The Clock (Christian Marclay, 2010), an art video 
installation constructed from thousands of time-related scenes from films 
and television shows, edited to be shown in real-time throughout the 24 
hours of a day. The time duration of Near Death, extensive in its internal 
sequences and as a whole, ushers in a sense of voyeurism, especially 
considering dying as a neglected an unseen image in modern societies. If any 
critique can be made towards our connection with Wiseman’s film, it is 
precisely around the pitfalls derived from the sense of observation, dissimilar 
from personal interaction and creator of an unresolved distance, innate to a 
technological mediated consciousness of the experience.   
In the relation between the phenomenology of dying as a documentary event 
and the phenomenology of time consciousness, time duration plays a central 
role. When contemplating the gestures and inscriptions of dying in front of 
the camera, I become closer to emotional authenticity and consciousness of 
experience. In fact, from the protracted length of the filmic form, our 
involvement in confronting mortality can transcend the initial visceral shock, 
becoming recognition and pattern and familiarizing us with death. This 
happens through a gradual withdrawing of all the symbols that cover death, 
already impregnated with social constructions, external pressures and a 
horror that is, to a large extent, produced by the collective, by the force of the 
crowd. Ponty writes that “it is by living my time that I can understand other 
times.”95 I argue that, departing from the reversibility of the I/eye of the 
screen and the I/eye of the film viewer, the opposite is also true. It is through 
attentive surveillance of the time of the other and the time of individual dying 
that I can, ultimately, become closer to the limited duration of the body I 
inhabit.  
 
2.6 PRESENTIFICATION OF TIME AND SISYPHIC GESTURE  
WHEN I READ a newspaper article about the crash of an airplane stating that 
all the 150 passengers were killed, I respond to the gruesome incident, 
reacting physically and emotionally to the initial shock and unimaginable 
suffering of those who died and of those who are grieving. Nonetheless, this 
response is constituted by second-hand feelings, projecting my own fears 
without truly witnessing or experiencing them in first person. What happens 
is an open precedent, a referent that was presented to me in its veracious 
indexicality, and that therefore can be transferred to my own body and lived 
by it as a possible and arbitrary unknown, starting in the present and being 
extended to any time onwards from now. After the initial shock of the fact, 
the event becomes, through time, distant, forgetful, as far away as the 
physical distance I had from it when it happened. However, if I witness a man 
hit abruptly by a car while I cross a street, if I see it with my own eyes and 
share the same space-time coordinates, if the man dies in front of me, this 
experience will become literally crusted on me, breaking my perception of 
the lived-body, producing a tormenting effect beyond the shock and, 
consequently, echoing as a trauma. The idea that that man could have been 
me becomes stronger, together with the perception that my body weathered 
the storm for some reason that exceeds my rationality and 
acknowledgements. Death is no longer a hidden possibility that waits in the 
dark but a certainty in the daylight, burning as the sun of the noon in a                                                         
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tropical country. When death happens in front of me, in present time, it 
grasps haptic powers – it touches me.  
According to Merleau-Ponty, “ultimate consciousness is the consciousness of 
the present”, since “in the present and in perception, my being and my 
consciousness are one.” Considering that “we hold time in its entirety and we 
are present to ourselves because we are present in and toward the world,” 
Ponty opens the possibility for a self-awareness of the film viewer within 
confrontation with the film form, since it is always primarily in the present 
that this immediate and rough relation is constituted. 96  As affirmed by 
Christian Metz, “the spectator always sees movement as being present (even 
if it duplicates past movement).”97 The dying body of Near Death, due the 
infinite possibilities of its reproduction, is always a body in the present, 
eternally condemned to many deaths.  
In Greek mythology, Sisyphus, King of Ephyra, is compelled to roll a giant 
boulder up a steep hill as a punishment. Every time Sisyphus arrived to the 
top of the hill, he observed the boulder rolling down, doomed to repeat his 
action for all eternity. The core structure of Near Death seems to grasp a 
Sisyphic gesture, depicting death as a never-ending circle and the task of re-
establishing life as an always-incomplete action within the hospital’s 
corridors.  
At intervals of approximately two hours, we return to the external world – to 
the movements and lights of the city, the dichotomy of day and night, the 
quotidian life where people exist without interruptions and cars come and go 
in the streets – in order to repeat, once again, a zoom-in toward Beth Israel’s 
Hospital. In one of the last framings of the documentary, a car carrying a 
lifeless body from the hospital’s morgue departs from the institution. The 
funerary car, which will soon be in the streets alongside the other cars 
crossing the city, works as a reminder of death as an insider hidden in every 
day’s chaos. The Sisyphic gesture of Wiseman’s film transports the boulder 
to the hands of an active film viewer, continuously designed to find, in vain, 
a closure or a visible sign of the moment of transformation from being to 
nonbeing. Death, as an invisible and unsparing villain, cannot be 
interrupted. In Near Death, the end has no end.  
Vivian Sobchack affirms, following that line of thought, that “the classic 
‘proof’ of the excess of death over its indexical representation was the 
fascination exerted by the Zapruder film of Jonh Kennedy’s assassination; 
played again and again, slowed down, stopped frame by frame, the 
momentum of death escaped each moment of its representation.” 98  The 
depiction of death within documentary entails, therefore, the possibility to 
infinitely reproduce and observe the indefinable passage from one state to 
the other while, at the same time, grasping tightly the exasperating 
impossibility to truly see it.  
In Death Every Afternoon, André Bazin discusses The Bullfight (La Course 
de Taureaux, Pierre Braunberger, 1949) in the light of the limitless 
reproduction of the filmic register of death, “surely one of those rare events 
that justifies the term (…) cinematic specificity”:                                                         
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I cannot repeat a single moment of my life, but cinema can repeat any one of 
these moments indefinitely before my eyes. If it is true that for consciousness 
no moment is equal to any other, there is one on which this fundamental 
difference converges, and that is the moment of death. For every creature, 
death is the unique moment par excellence. The qualitative time of life is 
retroactively defined in relation to it. It marks the frontier between the 
duration of consciousness and the objective time of things. Death is nothing 
but one moment after another, but it is the last.99 
Considering The Bullfight as a film of profound physical realism, in which 
the editing creates an undeviating state of alarm and where mortality is 
always at stake, Bazin describes the sense of substantiality proposed by those 
moving-images: “I have never been to a bullfight, and it would be ridiculous 
of me to claim that the film lets me feel the same emotions, but I do claim 
that it gives me its essential quality, its metaphysical kernel: death.”100 As 
Adam Lowenstein affirms, filmic time as understood by Bazin makes the 
instant of death recordable and rethinkable when welcoming the conversion 
from subjective consciousness to objective thingness. 101  In Braunberger’s 
footage, organized between the documentary and the film-essay, a toreador 
called Manolette dies in the bullring. For Bazin, this representation of a real 
death is both a metaphysical obscenity – since “we do not die twice” – and a 
material eternity – since, “on the screen, the toreador dies every 
afternoon.”102  
In Near Death, where the narrative always begins in medias res, the 
(in)visible deaths in front of our eyes can also be repeated incessantly, 
reiterated, operating as an unpolluted memento mori. Filmic form always 
had, ultimately, the capability to imprint its own ghosts, protecting the 
fleeting from its own temporal status and living side by side with 
resurrection. Throughout time, Wiseman’s dying bodies will undeniably live 
many deaths.  
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Chapter 3  
Remind me (of our limited time) 
 
 
3.1 REMIND ME                                    
Fig. 7 - Between life and death, Near Death (Frederick Wiseman,1989)   
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“Is my death possible?”103 
Jacques Derrida 
 
IN Technologies of the Self, regarding the motifs of confession, purification 
and the adjustments between desire and action, Michel Foucault mentions 
Seneca, affirming that for him it was not “a question of discovering the truth 
in the subject but of remembering truth, recovering a truth which has been 
forgotten.” 104  Hence, it is not unintended that, in his analysis of Plato’s 
Alcibiades, when discussing the care of the self, Foucault mentions “a notion 
of a happy proximity to death – of old as a completion” emerging as an 
“inversion of the traditional Greek values on youth.”105 Besides opening the 
possibility of a relation towards death less progressive than cyclical, 
Foucault’s words underline mortality as an already inscribed and embodied 
notion within one’s body, existing between renunciation and the permanent 
possibility of remembrance.   
When previously discussing my fascination for film phenomenology, I have 
mentioned the supposition remind me as an oblivious request from the film 
viewer regarding his or her own mortality; a contract having as the main goal 
a rediscovery of the already known, standing between the wish to know and 
the fear of any potential truth concerning the end of the lived-world. When 
positioned on the context of indexicality, this is, of death and dying as 
authentic filmic events, the film viewer invites the memory of previous 
recognitions, unlocked since the first open precedent of a real death.  
Remind me. Remind me that, like the others, I am also going to die. Remind 
me of my biographical limits, of my corporal restrictions, of my transient 
signs and finite being. It is an existential invocation what is here at stake, 
when I attempt to put myself in the eyes of the other, in the eyes of the screen 
and, through them, struggle to see my own death. It is a movement that 
departs and ends in my body but needs necessarily, as a mediator, the dying 
body of the other, but also the film screen in which it is presented and 
represented. As affirmed by Sobchack, the screen constitutes also the 
expression of a personal and finite temporal existence, centring the discrete, 
discontinuous and de-centred experience of consciousness.106 Moreover, if 
assuming Ponty is correct when sustaining that “consciousness is originarily 
not an ‘I think that’ but rather an ‘I can’”107, I can die would be the logical 
assumption of a phenomenology of dying.  
During a person’s lifetime there are as many potentialities as the human 
experience allows. One can fall in love, travel to a new country or develop an 
incurable decease. Death, nonetheless, is more than a possibility. As defined 
by Martin Heidegger, it is a certain possibility. Through a film such as Near 
Death, it becomes clear, as Heidegger claims in Being and Time, that “one 
experiences daily ‘the dying’ of others”, being death feasible to define as “an 
undeniable ‘fact of experience’”.108 I argue that the indexicality of the screen                                                         
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event helps the experience of death metamorphosing into facticity, as living 
evidence and impression. Boaz Hagin, defending that it is indexicality what 
makes films unique traces of the registered objects and subjects, affirms that 
the moving-image of a dying creature “could solicit, for example, the same or 
similar reactions, obligations, evasions, discomforts, frustrations, 
satisfactions, or thrills which encounters with unkeyed deaths in reality could 
stimulate”, since the film viewer becomes witness of death.109 
Nonetheless, the question remains: How can a phenomenological 
description based on my film viewing experience improve a general 
understanding of viewing and, particularly, improve an analysis of dying as 
a documentary film event? It is known that personal subjectivity is commonly 
stated as the main pitfall of semiotic phenomenology. I argue that it is, 
conversely, its best value. How? We should go back to a classical example, 
more specifically to the Winter Garden photograph found by Roland Barthes 
after his mother’s dead while he was alone at her apartment. The punctum, 
even if defined by Barthes in Camera Lucida in association with 
photography, is a quality of certain images that can be applied to the filmic 
form. Considered a detail that paradoxically fills the whole image and a 
partial object with no preference for morality or good taste containing a 
continuous power of expansion, the punctum works as an image-affect that 
annihilates the medium and the sign in order to become the thing itself;110 an 
accident that pricks, but also bruises and is poignant. 111 It was in an old 
photograph of his mother took when she was five years old, in 1898, together 
with her brother in a Winter Garden, that Barthes, while looking for the truth 
of the face he loved, found the assertion of a gentleness that characterized 
her pose.112  
Barthes, who defended that the photographic image grasps the assumption 
that has been, this is, a paradoxical time where the already dead figures meet 
concomitantly the undeviating vertigo of the time defeated,113 wrote: “My 
grief wanted a just image, an image which would be both justice and 
accuracy: just an image, but a just image. Such, for me, was the Winter 
Garden Photograph. (…) It achieved for me, utopically, the impossible 
science of the unique being.” For Barthes, that photograph gave him a 
sentiment as certain as remembrance.114 Even though the Winter Garden 
Photograph is related to an already dead and intimate figure, to personal 
memory and imagination, what interests me is the binary recognition of “this 
person has been”/”this person will die”, also offered by the phenomenology 
of dying on the film screen. Neither of these premises refers to an abstract 
world beyond the rational, but to the lived-world we can understand. Until 
the present day I have also been, and in the present day I also recognise I will 
die, even if I do not consciously consent the latter.  
As reminded by Liz Kotz, it is “a possible banal image, or even a gruesome 
one, that triggers a flood of memory, a spark of recognition, and a sense that 
something private and precious has been disclosed.”115 As affirmed by the                                                         
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author regarding Barthe’s notions, the punctum cannot be the same for 
everyone, while the studium would be related to the coded, public and official 
meaning. Dying as a general and visible cinematic motif would therefore 
work as a studium, while somewhere within its signs and echoes of presence 
and absence can subsist the intimate punctum.  
Even if we avoid thinking about death, it does not mean it is not there shaping 
our lives and ourselves. The supposition remind me, as I have argued 
previously, feeds itself on a sentiment as certain as remembrance provoked 
by the confrontation of the film viewer with the dying images represented on 
the screen. A memory of the death of the other as facticity, but also an 
anticipated memory based on my sense of prospection when regarding death 
as the line of the horizon. Remind me is less a labour than an inner process 
of putting myself in a state of labour, in a state of openness; it implies always 
a partial forget me: my signs, my biases, my overthought and biased codes in 
a world I see but I must learn to see. Such a concept does not move towards 
a consciousness outside the film viewer’s personal schemata, but entails a 
limited and potential state of understanding, in between the unknown and 
the lived-world, where I become closer to the dying process. A state where I 
attentively, through an immersion mainly allowed by the core aesthetic 
structure of a film – in this case, of Near Death –, am able to see beyond the 
visible signs, recognizing the unsparing embodiment of death in my own 
existential dying body. Hence, the body of the film viewer enhances its 
dynamic qualities, “informed by its particular sensible experience and 
charged with its own intentional impetus.”116 What is at stake is, ultimately, 
a recognition of the irreducibility of my limited body through the dying 
person I see on the screen.  
How can the sentiment of Barthes, so intimately subjective and internal, be 
able to move me and be shared with me, a subject in the distance, son of 
another mother and another time? Because it inscribes my inner desire to 
find my own punctum, awakening my wish to find phenomenologically my 
own Winter Garden photographs – this is, the images where I can return to 
the essences, poses and emotional substantialities of the already known, 
forgotten along the way by the continuous shift of attention induced by the 
unfolding of the landscape. By sharing his intimate subjectivity, by 
communicating it to me, Barthes uses a phenomenological approach in order 
to influence my perceptual modalities and restructuring them. He allows a 
return to the self while prioritizing, rearranging and cultivating. Like my 
body, his body is part of the world while adding phenomenologically to the 
world. As concluded by Sobchack, “any objective description of the 
experience of the phenomena cannot be truly objective unless it also 
accommodates the subjective mode of that experience and addresses the life-
world in which we live as sensible and significant beings.”117 
Remind me is, ultimately, an emphasis of dying as a documentary event as a 
technology of the memory and of the self, rigorous but unpredictable. It is 
not a recall of an experience or an activation of imagination as in Barthe’s 
case, but a remembrance of death as facticity and inevitability: a return to the 
unique being which is also a return to its inexorable end.  
Bruno Forte wrote that “in the centre of the beauty we proclaim there is a 
mystery of death, of silence, of absence, linked to the silenced word that dies 
during the night, buried on earth; not a silence full of love secrets, but a                                                         
116 Sobchack, The Address of the Eye: A Phenomenology of Film Experience, 305. 
117 Ibid., 308. 
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silence of absence, of distance, of emptiness in the abandonment.”118 I argue 
that the supposition remind me, applied to a documentary film as Near 
Death, works in the reverse way: from a centre of death towards the mystery 
of life. If my first reaction to the film is underpinned by the unbearable weight 
of those immobilized bodies, by my rejection to those faces and restrained 
gestures and sounds where I lose the emotional coordinates, it slowly evolves, 
accordingly to the passage from dying body to dying person, to some sort of 
search for the holdovers of life. My attention stops being focused on the 
emanation of death by the dying body, but in what still links that body to the 
lived-world. Furthermore, my ability to imagine those bodies throughout a 
life that converged there, in that hospital, is bigger than my prospection of 
the corpses they will become. Perhaps it is merely my own denial performing, 
but the immersion process I inhabit allows within myself a perceptual 
transformation towards dying after the initial visceral shock. There is never 
an acceptance – since we never abandon our unconscious belief in 
immortality – but it establishes the dawning of a complex compliance and 
acclimatization of dying as a process inscribed in the lived-world.  
It is curious that, every time I watch Near Death, I feel as if I am holding my 
breath, surrounded by an ambient noise analogous to a colossal vacuum. I 
recognize it now: it is the feeling of being immersed under water, as an 
embryonic state of existence. As Ponty affirmed, “we will find the unity of 
phenomenology and its true sense in ourselves.”119 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
118 Bruno Forte, “Bellezza Splendore del Vero. La Rivelazione della Bellezza che Salva”, 
ed. N. Valentini, Cristianesimo e Bellezza. Tra Oriente e Occidente (Milan, 2002), 55; 
my own translation from the Spanish translation made by Pedro Sánchez Rodríguez in 
Dios, La Muerte y el Más Allá en Cine Contemporáneo (PPC, 2007): “En el centro de 
la belleza que proclamamos está un misterio de muerte, de silencio, de ausencia, se 
trata de la palabra callada que muere en la noche, sepultada en la tierra; no de un 
silencio lleno de secretos de amor, sino de un silencio de ausencia, de distancia, del 
vacío en el abandono.” 
119 Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 8. 
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Concluding Remarks 
 
 
 
THE PURPOSE OF THIS THESIS was to rethink the complex and controversial 
question of dying as a documentary event, particularly having in mind the 
convergence between the phenomenology of death and image and the 
phenomenology of time consciousness. Departing from an idea of denial and 
deconstruction of death expanding in Western societies, and considering 
documentary films dealing with the subject of death and dying as 
provocative, immediately ethically charged and commonly overlooked by 
audiences, I have attempted to analyse some of their reverberating and 
reverberated aesthetics.  
Defending a qualitative filmic analysis due the wide spectrum of the issue of 
mortality and to the incomparability of the world’s multiple deaths, I have 
found in Frederick Wiseman’s Near Death my main conceptual example, 
around which I developed on the cinematic perception and invoked affects of 
dying as a reminder of our own mortality. Considering the almost inexistent 
issue of natural death in documentary, I have defined the dying body 
represented in the film as a body in between, decoding it aesthetically while 
considering the implications of a phenomenological response to its visible 
signs. From the emotional cartography allowed by the close-up of face to the 
vacillating voices that cannot express, the dying bodies represented by 
Wiseman metamorphose into dying persons. What is at stake are figures in 
the transit between life and death and human portraits telling life-stories that 
cannot be reduced to their objectification, even if immobilized, restrained 
and deteriorated. The dying body of Near Death can be grasped, even more 
than a visible sign pointing towards the line of the horizon constituted by 
death, as an entity in between the visible and the invisible, linked to the 
unfolding of the landscapes, as Maurice Merleau-Ponty defines the flow of 
time for the moving observer.  
Misleadingly located under the act of direct cinema, Wiseman is a true 
auteur, conscious of the confrontation of his camera with the unfolding 
events and defining Near Death both during the shooting and in the editing 
room. His measured cinematic strategies create an act of viewing beyond the 
voyeuristic attitude, locating us within the hospital as a microcosm of the 
impersonal while deconstructing it intelligently. Through several moments 
of human communication outside the triviality of the social and institutional 
interactions, Wiseman inhabits and shares a phenomenology of dying and of 
the behaviours of those involved in the process.  
Having in mind the film form as an art of the external applying the 
reversibility process of seeing and being seen defended by Vivian Sobchack, 
I have established bridges between dying as represented on the screen and 
my emotional and intellectual responses as a film viewer. In indexicality I 
have found the keyword to define our relation when confronting the real 
process of dying as a documentary event, since it leads us to emotional 
authenticity and to a stimulating fascination towards the screen events, both 
distressing and attractive. It is indexicality what transforms the filmed 
subjects into unique traces, closer to a simulation of a real encounter with 
dying regarding the reactions of the spectator. Expressing anxieties and 
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desires, sheltered by a voyeuristic distance and stimulated by real-time 
contemplation, the film viewer is defined as a witness.  
In Near Death, the embodied duration and presentification of the time of 
dying allow an informed and immersive acknowledgement of the film 
experience. The address of our eyes and ears are turned into a landscape and 
soundscape of the dying being that, by entailing existential contradictions 
and revealing to be simultaneously disquieting and appealing, creates an 
attentive, poignant and thrilling gaze. We are confronting, ultimately, a 
quotidian event that keeps continuously to be dragged to the shadows. For 
being edified upon a world of the unseen, upon an intimacy that is not 
commonly accessible or leaves visual traces, Near Death can be considered 
an urgent and remarkable example when considering the phenomenology of 
dying within the cinematic structure. It not only activates our limited sense 
of prospection as it evokes the doubts of our unavoidable fading from the 
lived-world. 
By proposing a philosophical and suggestive conceptual proposition – 
remind me – I have attempted to define the open and personal contract 
between the body of the film viewer, the technological body of the screen and 
the framing of dying in documentary cinema. Linked to a remembrance both 
personal and collective, since death can link separate consciousnesses, 
remind me is a request connecting the indexical moving-images of death and 
dying with the concerns of existential phenomenology, which can therefore 
be readapted and updated through other filmic descriptions. 
Perhaps the act of writing the present thesis was an effort to rethink my own 
inexorable mortality, an attempt of confronting it and interiorize it. Cinema 
always constituted the central platform through which I have found myself 
questioning the controversial question of death and image, between ghost 
stories and last gasps. In the unification of film and phenomenology I have 
discovered a way to theorize and share my inner concerns while describing a 
sociocultural existential matter. Ultimately, in a contemporary world 
denying and deconstructing death and dying, it is imperative to frame and 
embody the core question of our limited time.  
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Filmography  
 
 
Act of Killing, The (Joshua Oppenheimer, 2012) 
Act of Seeing With One’s Own Eyes, The (Stan Brakhage, 1971) 
Bridge, The (Eric Steel, 2006) 
Bullfight, The (La Course de Taureaux, Pierre Braunberger, 1949) 
Clock, The (Christian Marclay, 2010) 
Crowd, The (King Vidor, 1928) 
Dead, The (Los Muertos, Lisandro Alonso, 2004) 
Grizzly Man (Werner Herzog, 2005) 
How to Survive a Plague (David France, 2012) 
Near Death (Frederick Wiseman, 1989) 
Night and Fog (Nuit et Bruillard, Alain Resnais, 1955) 
Of the Dead (Des Morts, Jean-Pol Ferbus, Dominique Garny, Thierry Zéno, 1979) 
Rules of the Game, The (La Règle du Jeu, Jean Renoir, 1939) 
Shoah (Claude Lanzmann, 1985)  
Sleep (Andy Warhol, 1963) 
United in Anger: A History of ACT UP (Jim Hubbard, 2013)  
We Were Here (David Weissman, 2011) 
What Now? Remind Me (E Agora? Lembra-me, Joaquim Pinto, 2013) 
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THE END HAS NO END
FRAMING DEATH 
AND THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF DYING 
IN DOCUMENTARY CINEMA
CARLOS PEREIRA
In a world denying and deconstructing mortality, the intersection 
between the phenomenology of image and death and the phenom-
enology of time consciousness seems to call for new attention in 
contemporary media culture. The recurrent motif of death in ctive 
lm narratives is opposed to its far more complex and controversial 
counterpart in documentary cinema. In documentary, the framing 
of death and dying is immediately ethically charged and the image 
of death tends to be socially dened as obscene. At the same time, 
indexical moving-images of death have throughout lm history 
achieved signicance as spectacular screen attractions, where the 
immanent voyeurism of the lm experience is linked to an intricate 
fascination for the real. 
Through dying as a documentary screen event, our perceptual mo-
dalities and self-awareness towards the inexorable end are at stake. 
Turning to the lm Near Death (Frederick Wiseman, 1989) as a con-
ceptual example, the present thesis will attempt to theorize the cin-
ematic perception and invoked aects of dying as an immediate 
and visceral reminder of our limited time.
